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AbstrAct: the aim of this paper is to show how James mark Baldwin’s theory of organic selection 
(also known as the “Baldwin effect”) can be fruitfully integrated with alfred north whitehead’s 
speculative philosophy, as part of the endeavor to develop a comprehensive process-relational 
evolutionary cosmology. in so doing, it provides an overview of the theory of organic selection 
and points to several concrete examples from the galapagos islands which elucidate Baldwin’s 
claim that organisms, through their selective activities and behavioral adjustments, play a causal 
role in directing evolutionary processes. i emphasize some of the affinities between Baldwin’s 
theory of organic selection and whitehead’s theory of prehensions, especially focusing on the 
latter’s notion of “prehensive selectivity.” overall, while Baldwin’s theory of organic selection 
provides a biological ground for a comprehensive process-relational evolutionary cosmology to 
be developed, illuminating the importance of whitehead’s theory of prehensions for evolutionary 
theory, whitehead’s overall speculative scheme can, in turn, strengthen the metaphysical, 
epistemological, and ethical foundations of Baldwin’s theory. in the course of merging the 
two views, i arrive at an enlarged conception of organic selection, placing it in context with 
darwin’s principle of natural selection. at the end of the paper, i take up the resulting question 
of the ethics of selectivity in general, arguing that the merger of Baldwin’s and whitehead’s ideas 
constitutes a “non-reductionistic critical pan-selectionism.” this position stands in contrast to the 
antagonistic standpoints of “selectionism” and “anti-selectionism” in the ongoing debates over 
the ethical dimensions of darwinian evolution.
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introduction
over the last century, a perennial controversy has concerned the notion of whether the 
psychologist and philosopher, James mark Baldwin (1861-1934) is truly a discoverer of a 
legitimate, “new” factor at work in evolution, in which organisms are considered to be 
selective agents, having a meaningful, causal role in evolutionary processes. Baldwin’s 
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description of “a new factor in evolution,” as the title of his seminal 1895 / 1896 paper 
suggests, implies that an explanatory principle, previously undeveloped, in relation to 
evolutionary processes had been arrived at, namely, one supplementary to darwin’s 
principle of natural selection.1 of course, Baldwin, in describing his theory as “new,” 
was not so much interested in its “newness” as he was in its “trueness.”2 in his writings, 
Baldwin uses the notion of organic selection to explain how it is the case that by learn-
ing, by making behavioral accommodations, and by developing new habits of activity, 
namely, by their own mentality and selective activities, the individual organism can 
indirectly chart the course of the evolution of their species.3 as expressed by Baldwin, 
the theory of organic selection “extend[s] the general principle of selection through 
fitness to the activities of  the organism.”4 as such, Baldwin’s theory may be termed a form 
of “organismic evolutionism,” as contrasted with “materialist evolutionism.”5 Baldwin, 
along with British psychologist, conway lloyd morgan (1852-1936), and paleontologist, 
henry fairfield osborn (1857-1935) arrived independently at the theory of organic se-
lection in 1895 / 1896. the name of the theory, “organic selection” was proposed by 
Baldwin and adopted by morgan and osborn.6 much later, in 1953, george gaylord 
     1. according to Baldwin, “it seems proper … to call the principle of organic selection ‘a new factor’; 
for it gives a method, hitherto undeveloped, of accounting for the parallelism between the progressive 
gains of evolution and the continued accommodations of individuals” (Development and Evolution: Including 
Psychophysical Evolution, Evolution by Orthoplasy, and the Theory of  Genetic modes, new york, the macmillan 
company / elibron classics, 1902 / 2005, p. 103). according to Baldwin, darwin himself had come close 
to grasping the principle that he had in mind, but he had not fully worked it out. he states that “neither 
[darwin’s] putting the factors together, nor the results which follow from it—the opportunity it gives to 
mind to guide and direct evolution, by preserving and forwarding variations in intelligent and social lines—
occurred to darwin” (Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities, Baltimore, review Publishing, pp. 18-19).
     2. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 153.
     3. in f. h. osborn’s synopsis, “the hypothesis [of organic selection] … is, briefly, that ontogenetic 
adaptation … enables animals and plants to survive very critical changes in their environment. thus all the 
individuals of a race are similarly modified over such long periods of time that, very gradually, congenital 
variations which happen to coincide with the ontogenic adaptive modifications are collected and become 
phylogenetic. thus there would result an apparent but not real transmission of acquired characters. what 
appears to be new … in organic selection is, first, the emphasis laid upon the almost unlimited powers of 
individual adaptation; second, the extension of such adaptation without any effect upon heredity for long 
periods of time; third, that heredity slowly adapts itself  to the needs of  a race in a new environment along lines anticipated 
by individual adaptation, and therefore alone definite and determinate lines” (Baldwin, Development and Evolution, pp. 
339-340). 
     4. Baldwin, ‘Physical and social heredity,’ American Naturalist, 1896, p. 427.
     5. since Baldwin’s theory of organic selection alludes to the notion that individual accommodations, 
made on the part of organisms in relation to their behaviors and activities, have a meaningful impact on 
the course of evolution, if true, it can also be seen as undoing the neo-cartesian assumption that organisms 
are simply preprogrammed automatons, completely lacking mentality, agency, and the ability to learn new 
behaviors.
     6. Baldwin writes, “the term ‘organic selection’ was proposed … on two grounds: (1) because the organism, 
by effecting accommodations, screens its characters, and so gives them a chance of being kept alive; and 
(2) because the organism thus, so to speak, selects itself; that is, it is its own accommodations which are 
instrumental in securing its survival. it is the behavior of the organism, therefore, which is important, and 
not the variations alone, as in simple natural selection generally—and hence the adjective ‘organic.’ it is 
in so far the organic functions, reactions, struggles, efforts, conscious choices, etc. —which really count and 
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simpson termed a version of the theory, “the Baldwin effect.”7
at first glance, the theory of organic selection seems to offer questionable theses 
in light of mainstream biological research which operates under the paradigm known 
as “the modern synthesis.” “the modern synthesis,” a development in biology which 
took place from the 1920s to the 1950s and was assisted by figures such as Julian huxley, 
theodosius dobzhansky, and ernst mayr, largely involved the merging of darwin’s 
theory of evolution by natural selection with mendelian and population genetics. “the 
modern synthesis” also involved a rejection of views running counter to these core prin-
ciples, such as was found in lamarckian,8 orthogenetic, and saltational theories. Phi-
losophers and psychologists have employed the term “neo-darwinism”9 to designate a 
determine what sort of characters shall be saved by natural selection” (Baldwin, ‘organic selection’ in 
Dictionary of  Philosophy and Psychology, 1901, or-oz 2-3).
     7. according to richards, Darwin and the Emergence of  Evolutionary Theories of  Mind and Behavior, chicago, 
university of chicago Press, 1987, pp. 490-502, while Baldwin “never overtly claimed priority” for its 
discovery, nor did anything “intentionally deceitful” to assert his claim over it, he did doing the best job of 
the three in controlling the language surrounding discussion of the theory. also, Baldwin repeatedly alluding 
to the genesis of the idea in his work, and published the others’ papers as fully-acknowledged appendices 
in his work. for these reasons, Baldwin’s name was largely given priority in the advancement of the notion 
in the scholarly culture. later, Baldwin’s priority was virtually cemented over the concept, the theory was 
dubbed, the “Baldwin effect” by george gaylord simpson. i am not at ease with the implications of the 
title, the “Baldwin effect.” although most scholars seem to embrace it, not only does it characterize the 
theory as simply the Baldwin’s discovery, but the word “effect” implies a focus on the net evolutionary result 
of the phenomenon, thereby neglecting Baldwin’s original reference to the role of organisms in making 
individual accommodations as an indirect cause of the direction the evolutionary processes. this, i believe, 
implies a mechanistic interpretation of the theory. therefore, i prefer to return to Baldwin’s term, “organic 
selection.” this stance in terms of terminology is also helpful in deciphering between Baldwin’s original and 
authentic formulations of the theory, some of its more contemporary neo-Baldwinian interpretations, as 
well as even looser, more popular interpretations which use the term to describe pretty much any quirk or 
wrinkle that is at odds with the standard version of evolutionary theory. it also signals that in the foregoing, 
amidst subsequent interpretations and re-interpretations over the past century, in my analysis, i shall be 
endeavoring to go “back to Baldwin” to try to grasp the original meaning of the theory that he articulated, 
and then to develop some novel cosmological speculations concerning the meaning of organic selection.
     8. waddington defines lamarckism as follows: “[lamarck] supposed that evolution had come about 
by means of processes which involved causal interactions between the organism and its surrounding 
circumstances, the environment … the first stage in an evolutionary change is for the organism … to 
decide by an act of will to change its environment—to move into a new region or to carry on its life in some 
different way from that it had used in the past. its new habits created what lamarck called new ‘besoins’, 
and new structures then arose in the animal in correspondence with these … lamarck was arguing that 
when an animal is faced with new necessities in the carrying on of its life it will develop new structures 
or abilities suitable for performing what is being required of it. moreover, lamarck urged that these new 
structures or facilities would be passed on to the offspring through heredity so that they would result in 
a true evolutionary change” (Nature and Life, new york, george allan & unwin ltd. / athenaum, 1961 / 
1962, p. 79).
     9. following francisco ayala’s commentary in cobb (ed.), Back to Darwin: A Richer Account of  Evolution, 
grand rapids, william B. eerdman’s Publishing company, 2008, p. 53, to the effect that the term, “neo-
darwinism” is employed almost exclusively by critical observers from philosophy and psychology and not 
by biologists themselves, namely, that “the term ‘neo-darwinism’ has little currency among evolutionary 
biologists [and that] … in current use, it seems that the term ‘neo-darwinism’ and its cognates are mostly 
confined to the writings of philosophers and theologians,” in the foregoing, i shall employ this term as 
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rigid adherence to the set of assumptions emerging from “the modern synthesis” that is 
found in the mainstream of biology. from the “neo-darwinist” perspective, the theory 
of organic selection is generally characterized as a residue of lamarckism or of vital-
ism, or is dismissed as offering explanations based on notions of “purpose” and of “final 
causality.” in mainstream biology, larmarckian explanations, holding that phenotypic 
variations take place as a direct result of the environmental conditions that organisms 
face, have essentially been relegated to an instantiation of the fallacy of “false cause,” 
and have been summarily dismissed as “in conflict with the principle of causality in 
vogue in the materialistically-minded modern science.”10 in a parallel manner, propo-
nents of “the modern synthesis” have recommended that Baldwin’s theory of organic 
selection be disbanded altogether “as either a trivially true example of normal natural 
selection at work or a flatly false regression to lamarckism.”11 however, throughout his 
work, Baldwin maintains that the hypothesis of organic selection is explicitly “dar-
winian.” consistent with the theory of natural selection, it attempts to provide an ac-
count for the appearance of the inheritance of useful variations on the part of organ-
isms arising by way of the influence of the environment, without the need to embrace 
lamarckism or neo-lamarckism. it is also not a vitalistic theory, because it does not 
assume that the minds of organisms are directly responsible for evolutionary advances.12 
rather, it claims only an indirect causal role for mentality in evolutionary processes that 
is consonant with natural selection. from these considerations, the theory of organic 
selection deserves a deeper investigation and should not be simply made subject to the 
Semmelweis Reflex, or the habit of biologists to automatically reject appeals to the men-
talities, the behaviors, and the activities of organisms as playing a role in evolutionary 
processes.
later in the twentieth century, theoretical biologist conrad hal waddington’s notion 
of “genetic assimilation” was held to be analogous to some aspects of Baldwin’s theory of 
organic selection.13 as Jablonka and lamb (2005) suggest, waddington’s
genetic assimilation experiments show how darwinian mechanisms can produce 
apparently lamarckian evolution … [but far more importantly] they show how, 
when faced with an environmental challenge, induced developmental changes 
sparingly as possible, so as to avoid the “essentialist fallacy” in my descriptions of various biological 
researches.
     10. dobzhansky 1940, quoted in gould, The Structure of  Evolutionary Theory, cambridge, harvard university 
Press, 2002, p. 454.
     11. mayr and dobzhansky 1963, quoted by depew in weber and depew (eds.), Evolution and Learning: The 
Baldwin Effect Reconsidered, cambridge, the mit Press, 2003, p. 4.
     12. for Baldwin, the theory of organic selection allows for “consciousness [to be seen as] a ‘factor’ [in 
evolutionary processes] without resorting to the vague postulates of ‘self-adaptation,’ ‘growth-force,’ ‘will-
effort,’ etc., which have become so common of late among the advocates of the new vitalism” (Development 
and Evolution, p. 70).
     13. one source goes so far as to describe waddington as “a champion of the principle of ‘organic selection’, 
in which environmentally induced changes in somatic (body) cells can result in hereditary changes, not 
because they affect the hereditary material (dna) itself, but because they enable the population to survive 
long enough to allow the accumulation and selection of similar hereditary changes”
(see http://encyclopedia.farlex.com/waddington,+conrad+hal).
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unmask already existing genetic variation, which can then be captured by natural 
selection.14
in one experiment, waddington
raised fruit flies on a high-salt medium and selectively bred flies that developed 
larger anal papillae in response, which helped the flies to excrete salt from their 
bodies. after twenty-one generations of selective breeding, this new phenotype 
(larger anal papillae), although initially elicited only in response to an adverse 
environmental condition, developed in the absence of the high-salt condition.15
this experiment, as well as many others, provided evidence for the phenomenon of “ge-
netic assimilation,” since it is probable that in response to an environmental stress, the 
flies’ evolutionary pathway was directed toward a particular phenotypic character of 
adaptive value (i.e. larger anal papillae, which became encoded genetically), regardless 
of the continuance of that environmental condition.16
in carrying out his genetic assimilation experiments, waddington was preoccupied 
with achieving a “synthesis of development and evolution, to resolve what he experi-
enced as a conflict between the ordered transformations of epigenesis on the one hand 
and the randomness of neo-darwinism on the other.”17 in so doing, waddington hypoth-
esized that there is an “analogous interaction between developmental processes and ev-
olution, whereby developmental adaptations ‘guide’ or ‘canalize’ evolutionary change”18 
along a developmental path or “creode,”19 in a manner that has been interpreted to be 
     14. eva Jablonka and marion lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic in 
the History of  Life, cambridge, ma: mit Press, 2006, p.  274.
     15. ellis and Bjorklund, Origins of  the Social Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development, new york, 
guilford Press, p. 52.
     16. in a previous experiment, “waddington (1975) subjected pupal fruit flies (Drosophilia melanogaster) to 
heat shock. in response to this treatment, some of the surviving flies developed wings that contained few 
or no cross-veins. waddington subsequently bred the no-cross-vein flies and exposed the pupal flies of that 
second generation to heat shock as well. this produced a second generation of fruit flies that also had few 
or no cross-veins in their wings. after fourteen generations of selective breeding, some fruit flies developed 
the no-cross-wing phenotype without the preexposure to heat shock; that is, waddington showed that a new 
phenotype was eventually seen in the developing offspring, without exposure to the original activating 
environmental event. waddington referred to this phenomenon as genetic assimilation, which he defined 
as ‘the conversion of an acquired character into an inherited one; or better, as a shift towards a greater 
importance of heredity in the degree to which the character is acquired or inherited’ (Bering 61)” (ellis and 
Bjorklund, Origins of  the Social Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development, p. 52).
     17. goodwin and saunders (1989) continue, “[waddington] saw the basis for this in terms of the potential 
of developmental processes for adaptive response to environmental influences and the stabilization, or as he 
preferred to call it, canalization, of particular pathways through the epigenetic landscape to the adult form” 
(TheoreticalBiology: Epigenetic and Evolutionary Order from Complex Systems, edinburgh, edinburgh university 
Press, 1989, p. xi).
     18. anderson, ‘how adaptive antibodies facilitate the evolution of natural antibodies,’ Immunology and 
Cell Biology, vol. 74, 1996, p. 286.
     19. according to waddington, a “creode” is “a path of development [which] … exhibits a balance between 
inflexibility … and flexibility.” the notion “brings together considerations [of] … two separate bodies of 
theory, one of which dealt with the effects of genes on development and the other with the effects of the 
environment in modifying the characters of the organism.” he continues, “the creode is an expression of 
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akin to the theory of organic selection.20 although waddington maintained that there 
were strong conceptual differences between his own findings and Baldwin’s ideas, his 
results ended up helping to revive them from within the mainstream of biological re-
search. interestingly-enough, waddington was also an avid reader of the philosophical 
works of alfred north whitehead.21 like whitehead, he was devoted to re-conceiving 
life and evolution in a holistic, “organismic” light.
as described by Brian goodwin (1994), who was a pupil of waddington’s, one prob-
lem that has arisen due to the dominance of “reductionist” biology, is that it has ob-
scured the true complexity of biological processes and has led to the “disappearance of 
organisms from darwinism” as “the fundamental units of life,” since they are seen as 
“nothing but the vehicles for genes.”22 goodwin continues, “in neo-darwinism, organ-
isms [are seen to] have no agency, because they do not exist as real entities, reduced 
as they are to genes and their products.”23 in contrast to this “genocentric” viewpoint, 
goodwin argues for an “expanded” and more “balanced biology,” in which “inher-
itance and natural selection [do] continue to play significant roles … but [are] parts 
of a more comprehensive dynamical theory of life that is focused on the dynamics of 
emergent processes.”24 from this perspective, which contrasts especially with richard 
dawkins’ brand of neo-darwinism, “organisms [would] cease to be [considered] mere 
survival machines [or ‘vehicles’ that are subordinate to their genes conceived as ‘replica-
the potentialities derived from [a] whole set of genes … [where] the degree of canalization of the creode is 
a function of the whole set of genes” (Nature and Life, pp. 64-65).
     20. in defending an “organismic” perspective on evolution, waddington writes, “the first point that confronts 
us, for instance, is that before an organism’s environment can exert natural selection on it, the organism 
must select the environment to live in … even within a single species different individuals differ hereditarily 
in their behaviour; for instance, in their choice, out of a number of alternatives of an environment to live 
in, or out of a number of alternatives of an environment to live in, or a member of the opposite sex to mate 
with” (Nature and Life, p. 89). waddington also admits of a non-vitalistic, non-lamarckian role for mentality 
in evolutionary processes, stating that “we have considerable grounds for believing, then, that mentality 
in the broad sense, or at least behavior … is a factor of importance in evolution. But it is not necessary to 
suppose, … that an act of will brings into being an appropriate hereditary variation. the situation is that 
existing modes of behavior … combine with external circumstances to determine the nature of the effective 
environment” (Nature and Life, p. 91).
     21. see waddington, The Evolution of  an Evolutionist, ithaca, cornell university Press, 1975, pp. 3-5; also 
see slack, ‘conrad hal waddington: the last renaissance Biologist?’ Nature Reviews, Genetics, vol. 3, nov. 
2002, pp. 889-895. according to waddington, “it was, more than anyone else, the philosopher whitehead 
who provided the new way of looking at the situation which de-horned the dilemma [between mechanism 
and objective vitalism] … whitehead’s thought was certainly strongly influenced by that of the emergent 
evolutionists such as alexander. in fact his ideas about biology can to some extent be regarded as emergent 
evolution seen from the other end. we start from a variety of observable phenomena, and from these we 
construct concepts (or models) of simpler entities, by combinations of which we can account for what we 
have observed. these simpler entities remain, however, mysterious things about which we know no more 
that we have been able to discover by inspecting the phenomena in which they take part” (Nature and Life, 
pp. 19-20).
     22. goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of  Complexity, new york, charles scribner’s 
sons, 1994, pp. xv, 1.
     23. goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots, p. 172.
     24. goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots, p. xvi.
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tors’] and [would] assume intrinsic value, having worth in and of themselves.”25
Partly as a result of the interest that was generated by waddington’s researches, 
and partly as a result of the urge, on the part of biologists and philosophers of biology 
such as goodwin, to go beyond neo-darwinism and to develop a broader view of the 
biological world, in the last twenty years, there has been a small resurgence in terms 
of scholarly and scientific attention to the theory of organic selection. for instance, 
in Developmental Plasticity and Evolution (2003), mary Jane west-eberhard argues that in 
the attempt to develop a more coherent picture of evolutionary processes in biological 
research, beyond the mainstream gene-centered biology, “there is good reason to res-
urrect a modern expanded version”26 of the theory of organic selection. according to 
her, the theory rightly challenges the mainstream assumption, held by “most biologists,” 
that genetic “mutation is ultimately the only legitimate source of evolutionary novelty.”27 
the theory of organic selection is, for west-eberhard, consistent with the notions that 
genes can be “followers in evolution” and that “behavioral change often precedes and 
directs morphological change.”28 west-eberhard further suggests that “certain conven-
tional ideas about adaptive evolution have to change.”29 other publications, such as 
Bruce weber’s and david depew’s Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered 
(2003) have also contributed to this resurgence, providing an occasion for “Baldwin 
boosters,” namely, those who think that the theory has real scientific merit, to “face off” 
with “Baldwin skeptics,” or those who think that it does not. one notable contributor 
to that volume, daniel dennett, has been described as a “Baldwin Booster” in utiliz-
ing Baldwin’s theory to advance his philosophy of mind, although he may be seen to 
emphasize it from what may be termed a “neo-darwinist” perspective.30 while den-
nett questions Baldwin’s motivations in coming up with the theory, believing that what 
Baldwin truly aimed at was a “skyhook,” he does admit that “the Baldwin effect” is a 
useful, explanatory “crane” that does not rely on an appeal to the power of a capital-m 
“mind” for its legitimacy. in contrast, “Baldwin skeptic,” Paul e. griffiths, in his con-
tribution to the volume, argues that “excessive attention has been given to the theory,” 
simply because it gives false hope that in allowing “‘mind’ to ‘direct’ evolution” we may 
be saved “from the barren darwinian vision of a world ruled by chance and necessity.”31 
also, in the book, terrence deacon, associates Baldwin’s theory with the concept of 
“niche construction,” the notion that by their actions, organisms modify their environ-
ment, thereby impacting on their own chances of survival as well as those for other or-
ganisms.32 in another recent work, Evolution in Four Dimensions (2005), Jablonka and lamb 
     25. goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots, p. xvi, my additions.
     26. west-eberhard, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, new york, oxford university Press, 2003, p. 24.
     27. west-eberhard, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, p. 143.
     28. west-eberhard, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, pp. 157, 24.
     29. west-eberhard, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, p. 157.
     30. it may be speculated that dennett thinks approvingly of Baldwin’s theory of organic selection because 
he considers it to be a precursor of B. f. skinner’s notion of “operant conditioning” in relation to evolution, 
but would want to see the mentalist elements of Baldwin’s theory eliminated.
     31. weber and depew (eds.), Evolution and Learning, p. 194.
     32. later in this paper, it will become evident that the notion of “niche construction” is compatible with 
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point to the “Baldwin effect” as part of their overall thesis that there are four legitimate, 
interconnected inheritance systems (the genetic, the epigenetic, the behavioral, and the 
symbolic) which need to be taken into account if we are to truly arrive at a comprehen-
sive interpretation of evolutionary processes. Baldwin’s theory figures prominently in 
the book, especially in their account of the behavioral dimension, as they argue toward 
their more holistic understanding of evolution.
a host of other publications that either claim that certain investigations of biological 
phenomena provide proof of the theory, or give descriptive relevance to the theory of 
organic selection have also emerged.33 some of these are constituted by creative reinter-
pretations of the theory, which have gone beyond the intentions of the original. moreo-
ver, the “Baldwin effect” has recently been assimilated by researchers in other emerging 
domains of investigation, such as in evolutionary computation. this development was 
spurred on by the research of hinton and nowlan (1987), who initiated a computational 
model of how the theory “works” in relation to simulated evolution of neural networks. 
others, such as prominent geneticist, francisco ayala suggest, although questionably, 
that the theory of organic selection has already been assimilated into the mainstream 
of biology, in the sense that it is already employed by biologists as a viable explanatory 
tool.34 west-eberhard warns, however, that in order to avoid conflating Baldwin’s ideas 
with more recent developments and theories, readers and researchers should read Bald-
win’s original work, “rather than rely on second- or third-hand accounts.”35 it is in this 
what whitehead depicts as “the neglected side of the evolutionary machinery” (Science and the Modern World, 
new york, the free Press, 1925 / 1967, p. 111).
     33. for example, see anderson, ‘how adaptive antibodies facilitate the evolution of natural antibodies,’ 
pp. 286-291. anderson states that it was waddington who “revived [Baldwin’s] essential argument within 
the modern synthesis when he proposed an analogous interaction between developmental processes and 
evolution, whereby developmental adaptations ‘guide’ or ‘canalize’ evolutionary change” (p. 286). in the 
article, anderson argues that “the Baldwin effect is manifested in the genetics of the immune system. the 
conventional B cell population has all the requisite elements of a learning system [and that] … learning by 
the adaptive antibody population facilitates the evolution of a natural antibody repertoire” (p. 286).
     34. ayala’s statement in cobb (ed.), Back to Darwin, p. 193, that the “Baldwin effect” has already been 
assimilated into the mainstream of biology is highly debatable. as he suggests, “the hypothesis [having 
been] elaborated and made more precise during the twentieth century, in conjunction with the advance 
of genetic knowledge.  [it] became incorporated into the modern theory of evolution, largely through 
the russian evolutionist i. i. schmalhausen, whose main book was translated into english in 1949 by 
theodosius dobzhansky, a principle author of the synthetic theory.: however, this statement omits the 
summary dismissal of the theory by figures like dobzhansky. it may also omit the impact of schmalhausen’s 
relation to the lysenko affair, which may have served to undercut attention to his reference to Baldwin. 
cobb also questions ayala’s interpretation. for cobb, “it is interesting that when [ayala] deals with the 
Baldwin effect … he describes it in a way that omits any reference to the subjectivity, or even the activity, of 
the animals involved” (p. 25). he later continues, “ayala assures us that the Baldwin effect as he defines it has 
been assimilated into the dominant theory. my objection is that when the dominant theory of summarized, 
this new feature is omitted. ayala, presumably, does not consider it important enough to make it explicit” (p. 
222). furthermore, if it is the case that Baldwin’s theory of organic selection has already been assimilated 
into the mainstream of biology, then one might ask, for example, why even a mention of it was curiously 
omitted in s. J. gould’s, otherwise comprehensive volume, The Structure of  Evolutionary Theory.
     35. west-eberhard, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, p. 151.
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spirit that this paper has been written. at the very least, whether or not they are fully 
understood by researchers, the persistence of Baldwin’s ideas demonstrates that they 
constitute an irreducible chapter in the unfolding of the history of biology.
Process philosopher, ian Barbour has recently suggested that scholars of philoso-
phies of alfred north whitehead and charles hartshorne should
welcome this renewed interest in the Baldwin effect, even though it is [still] only 
found in a minority of evolutionary biologists. Process metaphysics postulates 
at least a minimal novelty and creativity in integrated entities at all biological 
levels. in this framework, one would expect that initiatives of organisms to have 
significant long-term consequences.36
in a similar vein, in his recent book, Back to Darwin: A Richer Account of  Evolution (2008),37 
process theologian John cobb recounts that the “Baldwin effect” is one of the keys to 
rescuing the process philosophical conception of the living organism from some of the 
more rigid assumptions of mainstream biological research. according to cobb, some 
of this research is dominated by the search for laws, material causal explanations, and 
mechanisms which underlie evolutionary process, thereby assuming a reductionist met-
aphysics and imposing it onto reality. to be sure, cobb makes the case that, from the 
“neo-darwinist” outlook, there is a tendency to view organisms as complexes of me-
chanical parts that are entirely conditioned by their environment, or as mere potentiali-
ties for mutational variation, or to presume that they are “nothing but”38 subordinate ve-
hicles for the reproduction of their genotypic constitutions.39 cobb also takes issue with 
the widespread view that genes are largely considered to be “atomic” structures that 
are entirely insulated not only from the phenotype, but also from the environment.40 
     36. Barbour, ‘evolution and Process thought,’ Theology and Science, vol. 3, no. 2, July 2005, p. 167, my 
addition.
     37. cobb’s Back to Darwin contains much of the proceedings of a conference on the topic of evolutionary 
theory in claremont, california in october 2004. also see cobb’s ‘the limitations of neo-darwinism and 
evidence for a whiteheadian theory of evolution,’ Worldviews, vol. 11, no. 1, 2007, pp. 32-43.
     38. ayala in cobb (ed.), Back to Darwin, p. 77. for a further explanation of the “nothing but” fallacy and the 
contrasting view, see ayala’s “guernica” metaphor in Darwin’s Gift (2007), 162-163, as well as his “gazpacho” 
metaphor in Back to Darwin, p. 81.
     39. this point of view is, to a certain extent, defended by dawkins, in his statement that the phenotype of 
the organism is a vehicle for gene replication; it is a “survival machine—robot vehicles blindly programmed 
to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes” (The Selfish Gene, new york, oxford university Press, 1976 
/ 2006, p. xxi). admittedly, for dawkins, this is not the whole story, as he states “in some chapters of this 
book we have indeed thought of the individual organism as an agent, striving to maximizing its success in 
passing on all its genes. we imagined individual animals making complicated ‘as if ’ calculations about the 
genetic benefits of various courses of action. yet in other chapters the fundamental rationale was presented 
from the point of view of genes. without the gene’s-eye view of life there is no particular reason why an 
organism should ‘care’ about its reproductive success and that of its relatives, rather than, for instance, its 
own longevity” (The Selfish Gene, p. 234).
     40. this viewpoint was originally handed-down by august weismann’s “hard inheritance” thesis. as ayala 
describes it, weismann “established that there is a separation between the ‘germ track’ and the ‘somatic 
track’ from the very begging of an individual’s life, and thus nothing that happens to the soma can be 
communicated to the germ plasm” (see cobb (ed.), Back to Darwin, p. 51).
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on the contrary, cobb notes that a whiteheadian conception of organisms sees them 
as “unit[s] of emergent value”41 which are constituted by their relations to other organ-
isms, as well as to their environment, and which are thoroughly engaged in their own 
creative life-processes. like Baldwin’s theory of organic selection, a process-relational 
view of evolution will emphasize the notion that the mentalities, activities, behaviors, 
and purposes of organisms play a role in the struggle for existence and in the direction 
of evolutionary processes.
in this paper, i intend to show how Baldwin’s theory of organic selection can be 
integrated with whitehead’s theory of prehensions, as part of the endeavor to arrive at a 
comprehensive and systematic process-relational evolutionary cosmology that is inclu-
sive of the vital role of the behavior of organisms as agents of selection. furthermore, a 
process-relational evolutionary cosmology will maintain that the selective activities of 
organisms are to be placed among the efficient causes of evolutionary processes. such a 
standpoint is validly sought by cobb and other scholars of process-relational philosophy 
as an alternative to the dominant mechanistic-materialistic outlook which is assumed in 
mainstream biological research.42 in the process of bringing Baldwin’s and whitehead’s 
ideas together, i show, on the one hand, that Baldwin’s theory of organic selection pro-
vides a biological ground for such a cosmology to be developed, illuminating the im-
portance of whitehead’s theory of prehensions for evolutionary theory. on the other 
hand, whitehead’s overall speculative scheme can, in turn, strengthen the metaphysical, 
epistemological, and ethical foundations of Baldwin’s theory. for example, it helps Bald-
winian thought to overcome some of the lingering sensationalist presuppositions regard-
ing cognition and experience which are present in Baldwin’s theorizing. in the process 
of integrating the two views, i further propose an enlarged conception of the theory of 
organic selection, one that is more thoroughly reflective of whitehead’s notion of “pre-
hensive selectivity.” this enlarged conception of the theory is placed in context with 
darwin’s principle of natural selection. at the end of the paper, i take up some of the 
imminent questions concerning the ethical dimensions of notion of selectivity, as it per-
tains to evolutionary theory, which emerge from this enlarged conception of the theory 
of organic selection. however, first, i shall provide a brief sketch of Baldwin’s intellec-
tual career as it pertains to the genesis of the theory of organic selection.
Part 1: Baldwin and the genesis of the theory of organic 
selection
James mark Baldwin lived and worked in the blooming period of the american intellec-
tual scene at the turn of the twentieth century. Prior to receiving his doctorate at Princ-
eton under James mccosh in 1888 for a thesis which was largely constituted by a “refu-
tation of materialism,”43 Baldwin studied briefly in germany under wilhelm wundt. 
     41. whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 107.
     42. as cobb suggests, the role and purpose of the book, Back to Darwin “is to develop a whiteheadian 
alternative to the presently dominant form of evolutionary theory” (p. 26).
     43. Broughton and freeman-moir (eds.), The Cognitive Developmental Psychology of  James Mark Baldwin, 
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over the course of his career, he taught psychology and philosophy at lake forest, 
toronto, Princeton, and Johns hopkins. in 1889, Baldwin published the first volume of 
his Handbook of  Psychology, subtitled, Senses and Intellect in which he articulated the basic 
assumptions of his integrative mental philosophy and his physiological-psychology that 
he had developed in his earlier studies and travels. the second volume of the Handbook, 
entitled Feeling and Will (1891), extended his mental philosophy “to the problems of feel-
ing, emotion, and voluntary action.”44 in it, he established the conceptual foundation 
for his later writings, focusing on the meaning of the notions of habit, accommodation, 
and the importance of imitation and the exercise of choice in the cognitive development 
of children.
in between the publication of the two volumes of the Handbook, he took up the 
project of editing two of an eventual three volumes of the Dictionary of  Philosophy and Psy-
chology (1887, 1891, 1905), to which many major intellectual giants such as royce, Peirce, 
James, dewey, Bosanquet, and g. e. moore contributed. this work was a seedbed for 
the further development of his ideas. it also helped him to cultivate and advance many 
mutually cross-fertilizing scholarly relationships and friendships, such as with James, 
dewey, and royce, and it was a “ladder” to establishing his own intellectual promi-
nence. furthermore, at this time, Baldwin developed a focus on the central role of “se-
lection” in cognitive attention and interest. in this regard, Baldwin’s work was mutually 
influencing on James’ Principles of  Psychology (1890), who refers to Baldwin’s Handbook as 
a chief resource.45 along with several of his other writings, it also inspired royce, espe-
cially, in the latter’s Outlines of  Psychology (1903).
in his 1894/1895 book, Mental Development in the Child and the Race (by which he means 
“species”), Baldwin’s investigations were in the domain of comparative psychology. he 
examined the psychology of children46 and developed parallels with animal behavior. 
norwood, nJ., ablex Publishing corporation, 1982, p. 26.
     44. Broughton and freeman-moir (eds.), The Cognitive Developmental Psychology of  James Mark Baldwin, p. 
30.
     45. while to a large extent, Baldwin agrees with the pragmatists’ connection of truth and utility, and 
he uses their analyses in his writings as part of his theory of organic selection, he did depart from them. 
while he holds that “not only is all truth selected for its utility, but apart from its utility it is not truth,” he 
also thinks that “reality is only the content of the system of beliefs found useful as a guide to life” (Broughton 
and freeman-moir (eds.) The Cognitive Developmental Psychology of  James Mark Baldwin, p. 95). on this note, it 
is my view that whitehead’s theory of prehensions provides the most systematic philosophical account of 
the themes raised through the philosophical contemplations of James, royce, and others. while there is no 
evidence that whitehead read, or was in direct contact with Baldwin’s ideas in articulating, they may have 
been on the peripheries of his awareness, namely, having second-order contact through his knowledge of 
James, royce, and morgan. it is clear that whitehead was inspired by the nexus of concepts of selectivity, 
discrimination, exclusion, negation, and transmutation, generated by these figures, in formulating the 
theory of prehensions.
     46. later, Jean Piaget, lawrence kohlberg, and lev vygotsky were heavily influenced by Baldwin’s 
discoveries and methods stemming from Mental Development onward, especially in relation to the advancement 
of the concepts of accommodation, assimilation, and equilibrium in biological evolution, cognitive 
development, and learning. see especially Piaget, Adaptation and Intelligence: Organic Selection and Phenocopy, 
trans.  stewart eames, chicago, university of chicago Press, 1980) and the Piaget interview in Broughton 
and freeman-moir (eds.) The Cognitive Developmental Psychology of  James Mark Baldwin, pp. 80-86).
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his genetic analysis centered on the notion that cognition was “a growing, developing 
activity” in the individual child, namely, a process, “instead of a fixed substance.”47 in 
this work, as well as his other earlier works, his reflections oscillate between two poles of 
study: the ontogenetic, namely, involving the study of the development of the single indi-
vidual from the “point of view of the [learned] functions which an organism performs in 
the course of his life history” and the phylogenetic, by which he means the study of the 
development of the history of the species and of animal life in relation to “the factors … 
which show themselves in evolutionary progress from generation to generation.”48 me-
thodically, he extrapolates his findings surrounding the individual child’s development 
of advantageous behaviors, habits, and functions to an interpretation of their develop-
ment in the species and their adoption by society. he also establishes parallels between 
cognitive development in human beings and the psychologies of non-human organisms 
in their interaction with, and adaptation to their environment, which, in turn, leads him 
back to consider further insights into the mental development of the child.
overall, Baldwin’s research in Mental Development is premised on the notion that “all 
stages of mental accommodation and development can be construed by the same prin-
ciples of [biological] adaptation.”49 in this regard, Mental Development constituted a chief 
step toward the development of the theory of organic selection and to a coherent posi-
tion standing in contrast to the weismannian “neo-darwinism” of his day. as Baldwin 
describes,
neo-darwinians hold that natural selection, operating upon congenital variations, 
is adequate to explain all progressive race gains. this theory, therefore, is able 
to dispense with the ontogenetic acquirements of the particular organism. it 
accordingly denies that what an individual experiences in his lifetime, the gains he 
makes in his adaptations to his surroundings, can be transmitted to his sons.”50
however, Baldwin outlined a valid, non-lamarckian explanatory principle which could 
account for their, albeit indirect, transmission to future generations.
Baldwin’s paper, “a new factor in evolution,” in which he first advanced the theory 
of organic selection in a fully coherent form, was presented just after christmas before 
the academy of science in new york in 1895, and was published in American Naturalist in 
1896. in it, he showed that “evolution is, not more biological than psychological,”51 and 
that organisms have a degree of agency in directing evolutionary processes. according 
to Baldwin, organisms do “not wait for chance, but go right out and effect new adapta-
tions to [their] environment,”52 in turn, playing a causal role in channelling the direction 
of the evolutionary novelties appearing in subsequent generations of a species. Baldwin 
postulated that, especially in times of environmental duress, members of a species may 
     47. Baldwin, Mental Development in the Child and the Race: Methods and Processes. new york, the macmillan 
company / kessinger Publishing, 1894 / 1906, p. 2.
     48. Baldwin, ‘a new factor in evolution,’ American Naturalist, 1896, pp. 442, 446.
     49. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 202.
     50. Baldwin, Mental Development, pp. 193-194.
     51. Baldwin, ‘a new factor in evolution,’ p. 547.
     52. Baldwin, ‘a new factor in evolution,’ p. 547.
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manage to make accommodations to their dominant modes of behavior, developing 
and selecting new habits or functions which allow them to adapt to their conditions 
and keep themselves temporarily alive. such new habits may be imitated, learned by, 
or passed on to other members of the species. meanwhile, certain individuals in sub-
sequent generations of the variety may, with reference to the eliminative processes be-
longing to the principle of natural selection, inherit congenital or mutational variations 
which will serve to accentuate, amplify, or perfect the performance of the new behavior, 
habit, or function, giving them an advantage in the struggle for existence. in this way, 
the evolutionary destiny of a species will have been indirectly “channelled” by way of 
the behavioral selections, initially, of one or a few organisms.
Baldwin’s paper was paralleled at the same conference by lloyd morgan’s own in-
dependent articulation of the “new” idea. a few months later, osborn announced his 
discovery of an idea which turned out to be virtually the same as Baldwin’s. Baldwin 
further developed the theory of organic selection in Social and Ethical Interpretations in 
Mental Development (1897) and The Story of  the Mind (1898). he then consolidated the 
theory in Development and Evolution (1902), extending to it the notion of “orthoplasy,” re-
ferring to “the general fact that evolution has a directive determination through organic 
selection,”53 and indicating that such directive determination could be studied scientifi-
cally. in it, Baldwin further aimed to bring psychology and biology closely in line by 
investigating evolution as a psycho-physical phenomenon, taking the mind and body as 
mutually dependent on one another. while this work is exceedingly repetitive in style 
due to his effort to unify his various articulations of the theory of organic selection, it 
constitutes Baldwin’s most mature and comprehensive expression of it. afterward, he 
did not revisit or expand the theory in a direct or substantial manner.
a scandal, which forced him to resign and to depart the american intellectual scene, 
largely divides Baldwin’s early intellectual career from his later work. he left the united 
states and pursued intellectual work in Paris and mexico. during the first world war, 
he played a role in strengthening ties between france and america. while in Paris, he 
became associated with the institut de france and came in contact with such notable 
french philosophers as henri Poincaré, Pierre Janet, and henri Bergson. during this 
time, he completed three volumes of Thought and Things (1906, 1908, 1911), which lead 
to a final volume, The Genetic Theory of  Reality (1915). this stream of work culminated in 
his theory of Pancalism, which emphasizes that “the organ of the apprehension of the 
real in its complete, synthetic, and … absolute form” is “aesthetic contemplation.”54 his 
Pancalist standpoint was constituted largely by the merging of many of the main ideas 
attributable to darwinian evolution, Jamesian Pragmatism, and roycean absolute ide-
alism. since whitehead was also influenced by the writings of these figures, and placed 
emphasis on beauty and on aesthetic experience in his own speculative philosophy, 
scholars may, perhaps quite fruitfully, compare it with Baldwin’s Pancalism. at any rate, 
in what follows, i shall focus on Baldwin’s earlier research in order to provide a more 
     53. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 142.
     54. Baldwin, The Genetic Theory of  Reality, new york, g. P. Putnam’s sons, 1915, p. 302.
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detailed account of Baldwin’s “two-part” theory of organic selection.
Part 2: an overview of Baldwin’s theory of organic  
selection
Baldwin is largely in agreement with darwin in respect to the latter’s stance on the ex-
istence and scope of animal mentality. in The Descent of  Man (1871), while darwin held 
that “no animal has the power of abstraction, or of forming general concepts, is self-
conscious and comprehends itself, … [or] believes in god,” he placed the human spe-
cies on a continuum of intelligence with animals, distinguishing between them merely 
by the level of the “higher development of … mental powers.”55 darwin believed that, 
like human beings, the higher animals have instincts, even social instincts, as well as 
many of the same “senses, intuitions, sensations, passions, affections, and emotions,”56 
including curiosity and wonder. for darwin, evidence of mentality in animals was indi-
cated through the expression of emotions, as he studied thoroughly in The Expression of  
the Emotions (1872). darwin also defended himself against the critical claim that in The 
Origin of  Species (1859), he had “attribute[d] all changes of [both] corporeal structure 
and mental power [in the animal world] exclusively to [heredity and] natural selection.” 
he stated that he was open to the notion that “some amount of modification [is due] 
to the direct and prolonged changed conditions of life”57 and that “intelligent actions, 
after being performed during several generations, become converted into instincts and 
are inherited.”58 furthermore, it was darwin himself who had opened the door to the 
psychological investigation of the behavior of non-human animal. at the end of Origin 
of  Species, he anticipated “open fields for far more important researches” suggesting that 
“psychology will be based on a new foundation [and will investigate the] … acquire-
ment of each mental power and capacity by gradation”59 in the animal world.
in light of the fact that darwin had held that mental life was a function of biological 
life, in Development and Evolution, Baldwin writes that “the occurrence of a psychological 
change in an animal is a fact in the same sense that the animal’s process of digestion is. 
and the genetic explanations which we find it possible to offer, in this case or that, may 
draw upon the facts of psychology.”60 in addition to being inspired by darwin, Baldwin 
was also influenced by george romanes’ Mental Evolution in Animals and by spencer’s 
System of  Synthetic Philosophy, in their respective investigations of animal mentality.61 es-
     55. darwin, The Descent of  Man, new york, Prometheus Books, 1871 / 1998, pp. 81, 88.
     56. darwin, The Descent of  Man, p. 81.
     57. darwin, The Descent of  Man, p. xxix.
     58. darwin, The Descent of  Man, p. 69.
     59. darwin, The Origin of  Species by Means of  Natural Selection, new york, Penguin Books, 1859/1968, p. 
458.
     60. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 4.
     61. Baldwin writes, “with the two great exceptions, spencer and romanes, i know of no biologists 
approaching the first rank, who have attempted to bring the phenomena of mental development—the class 
of facts most open to scrutiny and most important everywhere in the animal series—and those of organic 
adaptation, under the terms of a single concept” (Mental Development, p. 202).
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pecially, Baldwin adopts romanes’ notion that animals have a “function of selective dis-
crimination—[a] power of discriminating among stimuli and responding to those which 
are the stimuli to which responses are appropriate,”62 and he incorporates spencer’s 
analysis of animal reactions to pleasurable and painful experiences into his scheme.
coinciding with william James’ definition that “the pursuance of future ends and 
the choice of means for their attainment [are] … the mark and criterion of the pres-
ence of mentality”63 as well as his investigations of the animal psyche, Baldwin maintains 
that animals of various species satisfied, to lesser or greater degrees, the attribution of 
mentality. like James and royce, and in a way reminiscent of whitehead’s analysis of 
consciousness in Process and Reality, Baldwin emphasizes that the chief characteristic of 
mentality is attention, which implies operations of discrimination64 and selection. he 
describes that “the central fact of consciousness, its prime instrument, its selective agent, 
its seizing, grasping, relating, assimilating, apperceiving—in short, its accommodating 
element and process—is attention.”65 Baldwin believes that such selectivity is potentially 
universal through the organic world. for even if the purposes of organisms simply in-
volve the choice of, and pursuit of food and a mate out from a multitude, the selection of 
function or behavior, the determinate growth in directions as a discriminative response 
to the stimulations from the environment, the relation to objects in the environment, or 
the selective response to what was beneficial in their environment in contrast to what 
was damaging in it, then a degree of mentality could be attributed to them. he sug-
gests that “even plants must grow in determinate or ‘select’ directions in order to live, 
and their reactions are responses to stimulations from the environment.”66 additionally, 
Baldwin thinks that darwin’s notion of sexual selection involved psychological proc-
esses, and more accurately, a selective activity, stating that “one animal’s recognizing 
another and being led by this recognition to carry out the act of mating, we have a com-
     62. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 188, note 1.
     63. James, The Principles of  Psychology (vol. 1), new york, dover Publications, inc., 1890 / 1950, p. 8. 
according to richards (1987), for James, “the most important function of consciousness … was that it 
established goals and selected interests.  man and higher organisms, in James’ judgment, clearly revealed 
purpose in their behavior; they became fascinated by certain interests—from seeking food to seeking 
beauty—to the exclusion of others. this could not result from a passive accommodation to the occurrent 
environment, since goals and ideals were precisely those things beckoning from the future, and interests 
often transcended the commonplace and the present time. in James’ view, goals, ideals, and interests could 
be understood only as spontaneous mental variations that, in the life of higher creatures, had been selected 
to steer them through their natural and social terrain. ‘consciousness,’ in James’ pugnacious metaphor, ‘is a 
fighter for ends’” (Darwin and the Emergence of  Evolutionary Theories of  Mind and Behavior, p. 432).
     64. according to royce, even “decidedly low organisms and … in general the plants may respond in 
what seems to us a decidedly discriminating way to disturbances of the environment, when nevertheless 
the psychologist finds it of no service to his science to attributed mental life to the organisms in question. 
in recent biological research a tendency has consequently appeared to describe the apparently sensitive 
and discriminating reactions of lower organisms in terms of a phraseology that does not presuppose the 
existence of any mental life whatsoever” (Outlines of  Psychology: An Elementary Treatise With Some Practical 
Applications, new york, the macmillan company, 1903, p. 28).
     65. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 221.
     66. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 118.
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plete series of events involving the psychological process of recognition, joined with that 
of mating.”67 Baldwin further notes that “darwin’s personal use of the principle of sexual 
selection … seemed to require a very high psychological development on the part of the 
choosing mate, the female.”68 consequently, Baldwin agrees with romanes’ notion that 
“it is best to draw no line at all between life and life with consciousness.”69 this is not to 
say that Baldwin attributed consciousness or even self-consciousness to all organisms, 
since some animals have a very low degree of sentience. rather, he holds to a “middle 
position” in this regard, by recognizing that experience does not necessarily involve 
consciousness, but experience is never completely void of mentality. for Baldwin, men-
tality is not to be considered a static substance, but is rather to be constituted as itself a 
process of growth and development, with reference to the organism’s ongoing struggle to 
become better adapted to its environment. for him, mentality is not completely uncon-
ditioned or transcendent. at the same time, mentality is not shackled to sensation and to 
outer experience. rather, very much like whitehead (although we must here recall the 
latter’s criticism of the sensationalist doctrine as presupposing consciousness), Baldwin 
holds to a realism in which the sensations from outer experience
give the mind its material to work upon; and it gets no material in the first instance 
from any other source. all the things we know, all our opinions, knowledges, 
beliefs, are absolutely dependent at the start upon this supply of material from our 
senses; although, as we shall see, the mind gets a long way from its first subjection 
to this avalanche of sensations which come constantly pouring in upon it from 
the external world. yet this is the essential and capital function of sensation: to 
supply the material on which the mind does the work in its subsequent thought 
and action.70
furthermore, in Baldwin’s view, mental life is not to be conceptualized as somehow 
disconnected from the body. rather, it is a function of organic life. hence, his analysis is 
what he terms a “psycho-physical” interpretation in which “the development and evolu-
tion of mind and body [are] taken together.”71 for him, body and mind are considered 
to be parallel, continuous, uniform, and mutually dependent on one another, yet they 
are distinct. for instance, he holds that although mind and brain are mutually depend-
ent terms, mentality cannot simply be reduced to the inherited “hard-wiring” of brain 
functioning.
Baldwin’s theory of cognitive development and learning depends on the fluctuating 
interplay of two factors: habit and accommodation. on the one hand, Baldwin defines 
the notion of “habit” as the “readiness for function, produced by previous exercise of 
that function” which, in general, involves the “loss of oversight, diffusion of attention, 
subsiding consciousness.”72 on the other hand, the notion of “accommodation,” involv-
     67. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 4.
     68. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 155.
     69. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 200.
     70. Baldwin, The Story of  the Mind, new york, Bibliobazaar, 1898 / 2007, p. 23.
     71. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 8.
     72. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 160.
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ing an effort to learn and to acquire new movements and co-ordinations of new move-
ments, means the “breaking up of a habit, the widening of the organic for the reception 
or accommodation of a new condition,” which, in general, implies “reviving conscious-
ness, concentration of attention, voluntary control.”73 in a parallel manner, in relation to 
the biological world, he states that by habit and accommodation,
two great gains are made possible to the organism: first, the repetition of what is 
worth repeating, with the conserving of this worth: this is habit; and, second, the 
adaptation of the organism to new conditions, so that it secures, progressively, 
further useful reactions, which at an earlier stage would have been impossible: 
this is accommodation.74
in respect to human psychology, Baldwin discovers that the child carries out novel 
actions by way of a variety of interconnected factors, such as through imitation and cop-
ying (for example, of parents and siblings), maternal instruction, play, use and disuse, 
trial-and-error, spontaneous reflex and motor reaction, sheer luck and accident, and by 
way of variations on overproduced movements. also, he finds that a selective activity, 
which has for its criteria the feelings of pleasure and/or the feelings of pain produced 
by the new movements, is central in respect to the child’s repetition and transforma-
tion of them into habits. in one passage in Development and Evolution, Baldwin employs 
the term “selective accommodation,”75 to designate the process of the organism forming 
new mental structures. in any event, as part of his theory of organic selection, Baldwin 
carries all of these notions over into his analysis and his description of the “exploratory 
activities” of organisms which produce novelties in terms of behavior and of habit, from 
which it selects.
imitation is one of the chief ways in which new movements and new combinations 
of movements are selectively acquired and assimilated by organisms.76 the ability to 
imitate constitutes one chief characteristic of mentality. Baldwin describes imitation as 
a “‘circular’ process” in which, internalized reproductions or copies of the actions of 
another organism are selected by a subject, and are modified. according to Baldwin, 
in imitation, the actions are then “reinstated by the act of imitation,”77 namely, by a re-
     73. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 160.
     74. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 161.
     75. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 22.
     76. Baldwin writes that “the principal agency for the learning of the animals, and for the supplementing 
of their instincts, is imitation. the sight of certain movements on the part of the adult animals, or the 
hearing of their cries, calls, notes, etc., leads the young to fall into an imitation of these movements or vocal 
performances. the endowment which such a young animal has in the direction of making movements 
and cries similar to those of his species aids him, of course, in imitating these in preference to others. so 
the endowment and the tendency to imitate directly aid each other in all such functions, and hurry the 
little creature on in his acquisition of the habits of his species. we find young animals clinging even in their 
imitations pretty closely to their own proper fathers and mothers, who are enabled to bring them up comme 
il faut. there is every reason to think, moreover, that the tendency to imitate is itself instinctive. young 
animals, notably the monkey and the child, fall spontaneously to imitating when they reach a certain age. 
imitation shows itself to be instinctive in the case of the mocking bird, the parrot, etc. furthermore, the 
mechanism of this function of imitation is now very well known” (The Story of  the Mind, p. 36).
     77. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 28.
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enactment of the selected, modified copy on the part of the subject. Baldwin claims that 
“the young of animals, and especially of young children [learn new] functions [and de-
velop new habits] by direct conscious imitation of their elders.”78 as evidence, he quotes 
lloyd morgan’s citing of douglas spalding’s experiments in relation to the fact that 
young chicks imitate the movements of older fowl (i.e. throwing their heads up in the 
air) when learning to drink water.79 in relation to the acquisition of necessary functions, 
such as recognizing warning colors signaling a distasteful or poisonous food source (e.g. 
the redness of a virgin tiger moth), one can imagine the holocaust of organisms that 
would occur if each organism had to learn by its own experience each time, instead of 
imitating its kin.
in further pointing to the importance of imitation, Baldwin hypothesizes that “it is 
probable that many of the most ‘innate’ powers of the animals, are brought out, perfect-
ed, and constantly kept efficient, by imitation within the group or species.”80 imitation 
is not always successful, and organisms generally need to develop the muscular coordi-
nation in order to perform the copied actions. also, there are limitations to the types of 
movements that can be learned or performed, pertaining to the bodily and muscular 
apparatus with which the creature is endowed. nevertheless, for Baldwin, imitation is 
a chief means which enables the individual organism to acquire novel movements, and 
to repeat them. in the course of attempting and repeating such movements, accidental, 
chance, and sometimes creative variations may arise. from Baldwin’s account, no two 
instantiations of a similar action are ever exactly the same and learning by imitation 
does not involve a strict one-to-one reproduction of it. rather, learning by imitation 
depends on novel variations made on the part of the organism. to be sure, as Jablonka 
and lamb (2005) argue in relation to the behavioral dimension of evolutionary proc-
esses, in learning, each organism “develop[s] its own, idiosyncratic technique.”81 ac-
cording to them,
what is learned and transmitted depends on the ability of an individual to select, 
generalize, and categorize information relevant to the behavior and, no less 
important, to reconstruct and adjust the behavior about which it has learned. the 
receiving animal is not just a vessel into which information is poured … neither 
the transmitting nor the accepting animal is passive in [social] learning.82
as Baldwin points out, some of these variations are useful sources of novelty. they 
may be selected, repeated, and/or developed into new habits of behavior.83 some novel 
     78. Baldwin, Mental Development, pp. 246-247.
     79. another more recent example might be a herd of water-buffalo fighting off a pack of lions, where the 
one buffalo imitates its fellow’s charging and goring method, as is possibly evidenced by the famous and 
spectacular wildlife footage, “Battle at kruger” (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=lu8ddyz68km). one 
could also point to the imitation of domesticated apes of human behaviors, such as smoking. however, 
cross-species imitation may be dangerous to an organism as in the case in which a chick attempts to imitate 
the behavior of the old duck swimming rather than that of the old hen.
     80. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 282.
     81. Jablonka and lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions, p. 170.
     82. Jablonka and lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions, p. 172.
     83. Baldwin explains, “by this organic concentration and excess of movement many combinations and 
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movements may need to be developed gradually and laboriously, requiring several stages 
in which the organism selects from among its activities and makes slight adjustments. in 
any case, according to Baldwin, the “process of taking in elements from the social world 
by imitation and giving them out again by a reverse process of invention … —this proc-
ess never stops. we never outgrow imitation, nor our social obligation to it.”84 imitation 
is the chief means by which organisms cross-fertilize each other’s behavior, and when it 
comes to survival in the natural world, the ability to imitate is, for him, crucial.
Baldwin is open to the possibility that while some animal instincts are innate85 in 
a species and/or are generally fixed traits passed down from generation to generation 
through biological heredity, others are acquired through “social heredity” and “tradi-
tion,” namely, the set of adopted habits of the species or group of organisms in ques-
tion, to which the individual organism generally conforms by imitation of its peers and 
elders.86 however, Baldwin thinks that organisms are neither completely determined 
by their environment to behave in fixed ways, nor are they completely unconditioned. 
while generally, sticking to a habit points the way to the survival of the species, at cer-
tain times, survival and living well is conditional on such habits being overcome. in his 
writings, Baldwin places emphasis on the notion that habits that procure a deficient sur-
vival value can be transcended. he stresses that organisms have the ability to select and 
to change their behaviors and habits, and do so, especially when under the “storm and 
stress”87 of selective pressures, such as when a food source has been outstripped in their 
environment or when migrating into a new environment.
Baldwin calls the organism’s process of learning new movements, “functional se-
lection.” he uses this term to designate the selection of actions to repeat, largely, but 
not entirely, based on the pleasure and pain that they experienced on previous occa-
sions. for example, a fishing or hunting strategy, or a killing method which has benefi-
cially procured suitable nourishment for the organism stands a better chance of being 
selected and repeated by the organism, than actions which were unsuccessful or lead 
them into danger. organisms generally react with adversion to pleasure and to react 
with aversion to pain, but the development of new behaviors cannot be said to be com-
variations are brought out, from which the advantageous and adaptive movements may be selected for 
their utility. these then give renewed pleasure, excite pleasurable associations, and again stimulate the 
attention, and by these influences the adaptive movements thus struck are selected and held as permanent 
acquisitions” (Development and Evolution, p. 110).
     84. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 324.
     85. the word, “innate,” is not to suggest that instincts are eternal endowments of species, belonging to 
their essential nature as such. Baldwin takes issue with the view that “animal instinct simply a matter of 
original created endowment, whereby each animal was made once for all ‘after his kind,’ and according to 
which there is no further reason that the instincts are what they are than that they were made so” (The Story 
of  the Mind, p. 37) on the basis that animal instincts may be perfected, and/or are carried out imperfectly.
     86. an example of a fixed habit which has become part of a species’ “tradition” and/or an “innate 
instinct” might be that of the behavior of nazca Boobies (Sula Granti) on the galapagos isles, which while 
producing two or three eggs, allow older and stronger hatchlings to expel the younger or weaker hatchlings 
from the nest, thereby killing them off.
     87. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 228.
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pletely reducible to the contrast of pain and pleasure. for instance, higher organisms 
exhibit “will-power” which enables them to not be fully determined in their behaviors 
by the immediate feelings of pleasure and pain, sometimes taking on short-term pain 
for the sake of a higher pleasure or end, or even making decisions beyond the reference 
to pleasure or pain. to further explain Baldwin’s account of how animals learn new 
movements, under domestication, animals can be trained to perform certain tasks by 
their masters, usually with the inducement of food rewards. this ability to train animals 
proves that they learn, and that the selections of organisms can influence the selections 
of other organisms.88 in contrast, in the wild, animals essentially train themselves, for 
instance, by the success or failure in procuring nourishment, which either produces feel-
ings of pleasure or pain. in short, for Baldwin, the development of behavioral variations 
largely depends on the contrast of feelings of pleasure and pain, which, in general, acts 
as a guide to organisms in regards to whether or not to select and to repeat a certain 
action, thereby transforming it into a habit. whereas, for the most part, movements 
which cause pain do not tend to be repeated, movements that cause pleasure are re-
peated by the organism.89 as he writes, habit “expresses the tendency of an organism to 
repeat its own movements again and again ... [and thereby] to secure and to retain its 
vital stimulations.”90 for Baldwin, the recollection of feelings of pleasurable and painful 
experiences in the higher organisms is a vital factor in recognizing and selecting which 
movements to repeat and which to disband, and in forming new habits. memory ena-
bles the higher organisms to anticipate the probable future on the basis of the past, and 
it is therefore, a trait which heightens survival value. Baldwin, following darwin, further 
hypothesizes that emotions in animals are exhibited through muscular contraction and 
arise largely, but not entirely, as a result of the contrast of pleasure and pain. emotions, 
     88. Baldwin writes, “in the training of the domestic animals and in the education of show-animals the 
trainer aids them and urges them on by use of the associations of pleasure and pain spoken of above. he 
supplements the animal’s feeling of pain and pleasure with the whip and with rewards of food, etc., so that 
each step of the animal’s success or failure has acute associations with pain or pleasure. thus the animal 
gradually gets a number of associations formed, avoids the actions with which pain is associated, repeats 
those which call up memories of pleasure all the way through [and] … the result … so closely counterfeits 
the operations of high intelligence” (The Story of  the Mind, p. 44).
     89. Baldwin cites the following evidence: “soon after birth a young chick begins to learn as we say ‘by 
experience.’ he pecks instinctively at all objects of appropriate size, and by trial learns those which are good 
to eat and those which should be avoided. how can this be called imitative?  in the first place, we may say 
there is in consciousness only the visual image of the object, and the native reaction of pecking follows upon 
it. the result of this is to give the chick either a good or a bad taste. in the former case the experience of 
the good taste becomes associated with the sight of the object—say a caterpillar—so that at future meetings 
with the same sort of caterpillar, the instinctive tendency to peck is reinforced by the imitative tendency 
to repeat the good taste. this reinforcement tends to modify and even to supersede the original instinctive 
manner of reacting, as is readily seen in the way the expression of the instinct of pecking is modified by 
the experience. in the other case—that of a bad taste, let us say, using Professor lloyd morgan’s example 
of the taste of a cinnabar caterpillar—the effect of imitation is the reverse. with the sight of the worm now 
comes up by association the bad taste. the imitative reaction is now to avoid the taste; this tends to keep 
the instinct of pecking in check; and by repetition gradually suppresses it altogether in the particular case 
of this worm” (Mental Development, pp. 471-472).
     90. Mental Development, pp. 203-205.
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for him, are also acquired by organisms by way of the imitation of other members of 
their group, in a manner consistent with darwin’s theories.
to recapitulate, in Baldwin’s analysis, novelty in terms of the behavior of organisms 
is due to the interaction of habit and accommodation, which are active functions of 
mentality. as he further explains,
a mental organism is subject, at any stage, to the two principles, habit and 
accommodation … habit represents what is congenital with what it tends most 
naturally to do, under the guidance of experiences up to date. accommodation 
represents the degree of openness or adaptability, in giving the new reactions, 
which new stimulations or arrangements of stimulations call upon it to make.91
on the one hand, since habit “is the tendency of an organism to continue more and 
more readily processes which are vitally beneficial,”92 conformity to habit, in general, 
can preserve an organism, under “ordinary” circumstances. however, even through 
such conformity, new behaviors can be produced by way of chance variations on re-
peated, habitual movements, and those which are successful potentially lead to their 
selection by the organism and to behavioral adjustments. again, Baldwin calls the op-
eration by which the organism sets the direction for its behavior(s) in selecting which to 
rely on, “[functional] selection from overproduced movements.”93 on the other hand, 
new skills and behavioral novelties can be developed through the organism’s own ex-
ploratory activities, such as in animal play by which new movements are attempted and 
tested through bite, roll, and tumble with fellow creatures, the effective or “fit” ones 
being selected for future use, while the ineffective ones are eliminated or are rendered 
inoperative.
those novel behaviors or strategies that are employed by organisms and, as den-
nett describes, either produce or constitute a “good trick,”94 whether in terms of its func-
tion or in altering their environment, may be imitated, selected, and refined by others 
members of the species or group. if a species or group faces selection pressures and the 
selected “good trick” becomes requisite for the survival or well-being of the species or 
group, unless they are mastered by the other individuals, then they stand to be elimi-
nated via natural selection. it is in this sense that Baldwin describes the principle of 
organic selection as supplementary to darwinian natural selection, since “it recog-
nizes the positive accommodations on the part of individual animals by which they keep 
themselves alive and so have an advantage over others under the operation of natural 
     91. Mental Development, p. 366.
     92. Mental Development, p. 452.
     93. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 434. as Baldwin describes, “all new movements which are adaptive 
or ‘fit’ are selected from overproduced movements, or movement variations, just as organisms are selected 
from overproduced variations by the natural selection of those which are fit. this process, thus conceived, 
is there called ‘functional selection,’ a phrase which emphasizes the fact that it is the organism which secures 
from all its overproduced movements those which are adaptive and beneficial” (Development and Evolution, 
p.  87).
     94. dennett, darwin’s dangerous idea: evolution and the meanings of life, new york, simon & schuster, 
1995, p. 77.
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selection.”95 when faced with selection pressures, the organism’s capacity to change its 
habits can mean the difference between life and death. as a result, the development of 
the skill and the capacity to develop it may become pre-eminent in the species. it is for 
this reason that Baldwin places a premium on the plasticity96 of organisms in the strug-
gle for existence, namely, on whether the organism can respond flexibly and can make 
adaptive accommodations to its environment, rather than merely being fixedly attached 
to habit. for a new behavior can give a species the time, or the “breathing space,” it 
needs to be able to inherit variations which will help, at least temporarily, to secure 
its existence. on the one hand, those organisms which are flexible and can make ac-
commodations, thereby adapting themselves better to the environment, stand more of 
a chance of surviving and of reproducing. on the other hand, those species in which 
the individual members cannot make such accommodations stand to become extinct. 
at the same time, Baldwin recognizes that extreme plasticity, without any recourse to 
“tradition” as the foundation for the new behaviors, would equally be detrimental to the 
survival of the organism or of the species.97
as emphasized by Baldwin, organisms develop habits of behavior, but these may 
need to be “broken up” and to be overcome, especially when the organism faces severe 
selection pressures, when their environment changes, such as food-sources becoming 
scarce or unavailable, when they migrate into a new environment, or even when a spe-
cies itself becomes “too successful” and outstrips its environment of needed resources. in 
these cases, if it is to survive, “the organism must be ready, by a habit of acting, to impair 
the habits of acting it already has,”98 and to make behavioral accommodations.99 that is 
to say, plasticity with respect to the ability to embrace beneficial behavioral novelties is 
     95. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 170.
     96. as defined by west-eberhard, plasticity means “responsiveness,” “flexibility,” or the “ability for an 
organism to react to an internal or external environmental input with a change in form, state, movement, 
or rate of activity” (Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, p. 32).
     97. for example, if, when facing overpopulated conditions or shrinking habitats, an adult hippopotamus bull 
deviates radically from the “tradition” of its species by developing a habit of devouring male hippopotamus 
calves, even its own, so that it does not enter into later reproductive competition with them, it may be said 
to be impacting detrimentally on itself and on the evolution of its own species.
     98. Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, new york, the macmillan company / 
elibron classics, 1897 / 2005, p. 55.
     99. for Baldwin, organic selection applies analogously to the development of original ideas and to 
changing habits on the part of human beings, which not only affect biological evolution, but also social 
progress, and he sets out how this is the case in Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development (1897). 
certainly, for example, the advent of dating and relationship self-help books for men, which enable them 
to make behavioral accommodations and to learn new habits, has both social and biological effects. 
again, here, no strict separation can be made between the human and natural worlds. another example 
is that, today, we can all hope that human beings have the intelligence and plasticity to make selective 
accommodations (reducing energy use, increasing energy-use efficiency, and to develop the capacity to use 
novel sources of energy, such as wind and solar power) which will serve to develop alternatives to our “fixed 
attachment” to the habit of burning of fossil fuels, i.e. oil. and it is the case that human beings are starting to 
face real selection pressures due to environmental problems that the oil habit of produces, such as global 
warming. from a neo-Baldwinian perspective, to have a degree of plasticity and to engage in exploratory 
activities, rather than “wait for the variations,” would be the best course of action.
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a key to the survival of the organism. Providing that the acquisition of the new behavior 
is requisite for survival, or among a handful of behaviors that would serve to keep crea-
tures of that type alive, the organisms that are not able to throw off old habits in order to 
make the necessary accommodations would be eliminated through natural selection. 
But this is not the whole of Baldwin’s theory of organic selection and we now come to 
the second part of the theory.
Baldwin writes that “individual accommodations may keep a species afloat” but 
there are also “certain results in the sphere of phylogeny,”100 and in heredity, which are 
accounted for by the theory of organic selection. Precisely, the behavioural accommo-
dations, which keep the organism alive may be partial novelties of function; that is, they 
may be partial adaptations which have not yet fully developed to their most mature po-
tential and highest effectiveness. these adaptations would allow the organism to survive 
temporarily, but not necessarily to be well adapted to the environment. further benefi-
cial adaptation would require accompanying phenotypic traits which are coincidental 
with, or correlative to the new behaviour(s), which would further supplement the skill 
and enable the organism to master and perfect it, thereby arriving at a higher degree 
of equilibrium in relation to the environment. for long-term survival, in contrast to the 
short-term subsistence, depends on an organism being adequately adapted to one’s en-
vironment, and it not only requires plasticity, but also the phenotypic “equipment” and 
traits which enhance the success of the novel accommodations.101
according to Baldwin, successful accommodations which are transformed into 
habits “‘set’ the direction of evolution,”102 because individual organisms in subsequent 
generations which have inherited variations that serve to accentuate, amplify, or per-
fect, the new, successful behaviors, pushing them to maturity and to their highest effec-
tiveness, will be preserved via the principle of natural selection, while the others will 
be eliminated. in time, the new skill or function can be perfected by further practice 
or exercise, but also by having inherited correlated or coincidental congenital varia-
tions or traits (either physical or mental or a psycho-physical combination) that serve 
to accentuate, amplify, or perfect it. of course, for Baldwin, the sequence of such in-
heritance of mutational variations will be “random,” or more accurately, “indetermi-
nately distributed” in the variety or species.103 in any case, “those organisms which do 
     100. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 98.
     101. my distinctions between “long-term survival” and “temporary / short-term” survival, “subsistence” 
and “living well,” as well as between a “species as a whole” and “select members,” serve to undercut one 
of the chief criticisms of the theory of organic selection, namely, that if accommodations are effective in 
keeping an organism alive, then the organism has already passed the test of natural selection.
     102. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 99.
     103. according to cobb’s interpretation of ayala, in current usage, the meaning of the notion of “random” 
mutations is that: (1) mutations “are rare exceptions to the regularity of the process of dna replication, 
which normally involves precise copying of the hereditary information, encoded in the nucleotide sequence”; 
(2) “there is no way of knowing whether a given gene or genome will mutate in a particular cell or in a 
particular generation”; and (3) the mutations “are unoriented with respect to adaptation” (Back to Darwin, 
pp. 216-217).
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not secure the modifications fall by the principle of natural selection,”104 whereas those 
that do will be able to subsist, and perhaps reproduce successfully. thus, according to 
Baldwin, to a certain extent, the evolutionary destiny of a species can be directed by 
the agency of the organism, whose selected behavioral accommodations “run ahead” 
and “channel” the course of subsequently inherited mutational variations. as Baldwin 
describes it, the novel accommodations “screen” the variations that individuals in future 
generations will be selected for. that is to say, it is by way of such accommodative ad-
justments that “natural selection [is] compelled to act along a certain path,”105 since, for 
example, organisms that inherit morphological variations that are detrimental to, or do 
not help to amplify the new habit or function which enables them to survive, will tend 
to be eliminated.
Baldwin realizes that inherited variations which are coincident with, or correlate to 
the new, successful, behavior may not appear all-at-once. rather, they may take several 
generations to “mature.” Baldwin cites “bony protuberances in places where horns af-
terwards develop, and … certain small changes in the evolution of mammalian teeth” as 
examples of such gradual changes, which “afterwards progress regularly from one gen-
eration to another until they become of [more] utility.”106 But the speed of the variations 
or the accumulation of variations does not discount the theory of organic selection, be-
cause as darwin suggests, even the slightest variations can give an organism an advan-
tage in the struggle for existence. for Baldwin, from generation to generation, evolution 
takes place by way of the selection of individuals which are endowed with inherited var-
iations that supplement, are coincident with, or correlate with the acquired behaviors 
enabled them, in the first place, to subsist, at least temporarily, in their environment. at 
the same time, he is open to the possibility that phenotypic traits may gradually disap-
pear in a species due to disuse, especially in the wake of the newer ontogenetic adapta-
tions transcending, replacing, or advancing older behavioral habits.
overall, from a Baldwinian standpoint, the individual organism’s selection of its 
behaviors and activities can be considered an important “directive” or causal factor 
participating in evolutionary processes. the selected ontogenetic variations, having 
become pre-eminent habits, give rise to correlated or coincidental inherited variations 
in the species, via the operations of natural selection. Baldwin notes that the theory of 
organic selection “opens a great sphere for the application of the principle of natural 
selection upon organisms” because selection is shown to operate “on the basis of what 
[organisms] do, rather than of what they are; of the new use they make of their func-
tions, rather than of the mere [pre-]possession of certain congenital characters.”107 in 
other words, the theory of organic selection allows for “the organism itself [to] coop-
erate[] in the formation of the modifications which are effected.”108 Baldwin calls the 
“directive influences” of the behavioral modifications or accommodations, as well as 
     104. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 119.
     105. edward Poulton, quoted by Baldwin in Development and Evolution, p. 47.
     106. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 141.
     107. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 117, my addition.
     108. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 119.
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all agencies of such accommodation, including for example, organic plasticity, imita-
tion, selectivity, and intelligence, which play a role in bringing about the coincidental 
or correlative inherited variations, “orthoplastic influences.”109 he further employs the 
associated term, “orthoplasy” to designate the fact of the “directive determination”110 of 
organic selection in relation to evolutionary processes, as well as to the possibility of its 
study. Baldwin entertains the notion that the theory of organic selection could serve 
as an explanatory hypothesis for research into gaps and transitions in the fossil record. 
of course, the behaviors of organisms are not exhibited in fossils. nevertheless, due to 
the correspondence between the series of individual accommodations and the series of 
adaptations in the species, the theory could offer a framework for anticipating future 
evolutionary directions and novelties in a species. in any event, on the whole, Baldwin’s 
theory of organic selection may be summarized as the notion that “organisms which 
survive through individual modification [novel behavioral accommodations] will hand 
on to the next generation any ‘coincident variations’ [i.e. congenital variations in the 
same direction as the individual modifications] which they may chance to have, and 
also allow further variations in the same direction.”111 having now provided an overview 
of Baldwin’s theory of organic selection, in the next section of this paper, i shall take up 
some imminent criticisms of it.
Part 3: some imminent criticisms of Baldwin’s theory of or-
ganic selection
a first contention in relation the theory of organic selection involves Baldwin’s appar-
ent conflation of two distinct meanings of the term, “selection,” leading to the claim 
that Baldwin is committing the fallacy of equivocation in his writings. however, in re-
sponse to this criticism, in Development and Evolution, Baldwin takes up a query from w. h. 
hutton about the meaning of the notion of the word “selection.” Baldwin distinguishes 
between two different senses of the term, of which he recognizes both. first, he agrees 
with hutton’s suggestion that “selection means the act of picking out certain objects 
from a number of others, and it implies that these objects are chosen for some reason or 
other.”112 with respect to this first meaning, elsewhere, Baldwin states that there is “no 
reference to [species]-progress” and it presumably means “the ‘conscious choice’ of psy-
chology and pre-darwinian theory,”113 implying, to some degree, the selective activities 
     109. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 142.
     110. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 142.
     111. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, pp. 149-150, first addition mine, second addition from west-
eberhard, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, p. 152. Baldwin continues, “in any given series of generations, 
the individuals of which survive through their susceptibility to modification, there will be a gradual and 
cumulative development of coincident variations under the action of natural selection” (p. 150). elsewhere, 
Baldwin defines the theory of organic selection as “the process of individual accommodation considered as 
keeping single organisms alive, and so, also securing the accumulation of variations, determining evolution 
in subsequent generations” (p. 119).
     112. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 168-169.
     113. Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, p. 550.
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of the organism in general. at the same time, he also preserves the “darwinian” mean-
ing of the term as synonymous with the theory of natural selection, namely, that having 
the connotation of “advantage gained in the struggle for existence, either by the indi-
vidual or the species.”114 distinguishing between the two senses, Baldwin suggests that 
“there is only one thing to do, that is to recognize the two general uses of the term, ‘se-
lection,’ the pre-darwinian (or conscious) selection ‘for some reason or other,’ and the 
darwinian (or post-darwinian) selection of which survival on grounds of utility is the 
sole criterion.”115 as will be alluded to later in this paper, Baldwin defends the conceptu-
al unity of organic selection and natural selection, which may be said to “overlap” in 
the sense that the selective operations of organisms play a role in natural selection. in 
any case, in order to distinguish between the two meanings when not employing quali-
fying terms (i.e. “organic,” “artificial,” “natural”), in this paper, i use a lower-case “s” 
to designate the meaning of the organism’s own selective activities, and an upper-case 
“s” to indicate natural selection. in a later part of this essay, it will further be shown 
that an analogy can be made between the former meaning and whitehead’s notion of 
“prehensive selectivity.” attention to this distinction between selection and selection, as 
well as their interrelation, will especially be important in Part six of this paper where i 
develop an enlarged conception of organic selection.
a second criticism emerges from the apparent self-reflexivity of privileged terms 
such as “mentality,” “selectivity,” “imitation,” “plasticity,” “habit,” and “accommoda-
tion” in relation to whether they should be considered characteristics that are inherited 
by organisms and hence, the products of evolution, or whether they belong universally 
to organic life. in Mental Development, Baldwin sets out the two alternatives: either
life existed before selective reaction; in which case—holding that mind is 
coextensive with life—he must give up his criterion of mind … [or] life began with 
selective reaction as part of its original endowment, and with consciousness withal, 
that is, with feelings of pleasure and pain.”116
given this antinomy, the whiteheadian metaphysical outlook of panpsychism or 
panexperientialism would certainly defend a synthesis of the two, based in the notion 
that all organisms have experience to greater or lesser degrees,117 but at the same time, 
admitting that the faculties upon which experience depends can be refined through 
evolutionary processes. regarding the apparent self-reflexivity of the notion of organic 
selectivity, Baldwin speculates that
     114. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 169.
     115. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 169.
     116. Baldwin, Mental Development, pp. 200-201.
     117. as part of his speculative cosmology, whitehead embraced panpsychism or pan-experientialism. for 
him, subjectivity, mentality, and feeling pervade the organisms of the natural world, and whether or not 
the entities in question are considered either animate or inanimate, they participate in the overall creative 
advance and evolution of the universe. for whitehead, creativity is “universal throughout actuality” (Process 
and Reality: Corrected Edition, new york, the free Press, 1929 / 1978, p. 164), namely, all temporal creatures 
participate interdependently in the creative evolution of the universe, and they have importance in terms 
of the whole cosmological scheme of things.
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organisms that did not have some form of selective response to what was beneficial, 
as opposed to what was damaging in the environment, could not have developed 
very far; and as soon as such a variation did appear it would have immediate 
preeminence. so we have to say either that selective nervous property, with 
consciousness, is a variation, or that it is a fundamental endowment of life and 
part of its final mystery.118
concerning the ability of organisms to imitate others, Baldwin hypothesizes that it may 
“represent a form of variation which would be in the direction of the plasticity of intelli-
gence, and creatures would be selected who performed [it],”119 whereas the evolution of 
plasticity would be a complex and gradual process which may have “taken place by the 
cooperation of accommodation using the variations toward plasticity already present 
and thus saving and developing such variations.”120 in this sense, selectivity, imitation, 
and plasticity might be seen as functions of the evolutionary development of the acqui-
sition of the ability to make accommodations in general, which presupposes a degree 
of mentality. certainly, it is hard to imagine mentality, selectivity and imitation in the 
single-celled prokaryotic life-forms or in some of the creatures of Burgess shale ilk. But 
it is somehow less hard to imagine whether these beings had experiences. in any case, 
even if selectivity and imitation are inherited characters, from a Baldwinian perspec-
tive, they are operative structures of the evolutionary processes that are prevalent in our 
contemporary epoch, and hence, this criticism, which is recognized (but admittedly not 
fully resolved) by Baldwin, should not be seen to diminish the theory of organic selec-
tion as an explanatory scheme.
a third criticism involves the claim that even if the behaviors and activities of or-
ganisms do have some role in the direction and channelling of evolutionary processes, 
it is an extremely marginal one, and definitely not worth all of the attention given to 
it. this was certainly alfred wallace’s standpoint. while at first, wallace endorsed the 
theory of organic selection in his review of morgan’s Habit and Instinct (1896), he later 
became increasingly less convinced of its importance as an explanatory principle. wal-
lace wrote to Baldwin stating that “your account of organic selection … is very clear 
and i have no doubt is occasionally a real factor in evolution. But i do not think that it 
is an important or even an essential one.”121 more recently, simpson (1953) and griffiths 
(2003) are among those who also think this. as described by depew (2003), simpson 
believed that there is “singularly little concrete ground for the view that the Baldwin 
effect is a frequent and important element in adaptation … apply[ing] at best to unusual 
cases in which a population under very strong selection pressure” at “the margin of its 
range.”122 certainly, one of the most “anemic” aspects of the presentations of the theory 
of organic selection by “Baldwin-boosters” has been the lack of concrete examples 
they give in support of their claims of its legitimacy. although Baldwin maintained that 
     118. Baldwin, ‘a new factor in evolution,’ pp. 550-551.
     119. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 29.
     120. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 38.
     121. see richards, the Emergence of  Evolutionary Theories of  Mind and Behavior, p. 494, note 114.
     122. weber and depew (eds.), Evolution and Learning, p. 16.
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selectivity was potentially universal in the animal world, stating that “organic selection 
becomes, accordingly, a universal principle, provided, and in so far as, accommodation 
is universal,”123 even he referred repeatedly to well-worn examples. on this note, in what 
follows, i have provided a few examples of the theory of organic selection which may 
be said to provide evidence that: (1) behavioral habits are developed by organisms via 
the processes that Baldwin identifies; and that (2) behavioral accommodations indirectly 
channel out the course of subsequent congenital or mutational variations in a species or 
variety of organisms. afterward, i will respond to some further criticisms of the Bald-
winian interpretation of these phenomena.
3-1 The Vampire Finch
the vampire finch is a variety of the sharp-beaked ground finches, Gesospiza Diffici-
lis Septentrionalis, living on the dry climate of wolf island in the galapagos, where insects 
are less abundant and plant-based food sources become scarce rapidly. they are “the 
only bird in the world whose primary objective in foraging is to obtain blood.”124 vam-
pire finches, aptly named, developed the purposeful penchant for drinking the blood, 
exclusively, of nazca Boobies, through their straw-like beaks. Prior to developing this 
habit, they engaged in a beneficial symbiotic relationship with nazca Boobies, eating 
the ectoparasites that regularly infested the boobies’ bodies. it is hypothesized that at 
some point in the process of eating ectoparasites, one finch “accidentally broke the skin 
of the booby, thereby getting that first taste of blood.”125 the blood was more nutritious 
than other food sources and the finches that imitated and performed this parasitical 
action survived when other food sources were scarce. furthermore, booby blood was 
available at all times of the year. it is now believed that the activity of drinking booby 
blood has become “innate” in the variety, and that the genetic differences between the 
vampire finch and the other varieties of sharp-beaked finches, developed later. some 
phenotypic differences have appeared which are related to beak size, length, sharpness, 
and shape, which have served to amplify their capacities to drink booby blood, varia-
tions which other finch varieties, which have not taken to this habit, do not have. vam-
pire finches have the largest and pointiest beak of all G. difficilus varieties. the boobies, 
grudgingly still accepting this parasitical behavior, can have five or six finches drinking 
their blood at a time.
3-2 The Blue-Footed Booby
three quarters of the world’s “dunce-like” Blue-footed Booby (Sula Nebouxi) popu-
lation lives in the galapagos. the Blue-footed Booby has at some point developed the 
habit of dive-bombing for fish from great heights farther away from the shore, rather 
     123. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 38.
     124. ‘Blood Birds: speciation of avian sanguivores in the galapagos,’ http://www. stanford.edu/class/
anthsci10sc/2005_galapagos_website/papers/keil.doc, 1.
     125. ‘Blood Birds,’ p. 3.
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than fishing in the shallows, even though they risk the dangers of the sea or break-
ing their wings. with a piercing whistle directing them, the dive-bombing has become 
perfectly synchronized with other members of a flock, the many birds performing this 
action all at once in order to overwhelm their prey. Blue-footed Boobies have evolved 
a thick skull, complete with air sacks and neck cushioning, which has served to offset 
the negative repercussions of their habitual crashing into the water. with their beautiful 
webbed blue feet, sharp bills, and streamlined tails, the boobies swim a short distance 
underwater in order to catch fish. that said, ingesting saltwater is harmful to boobies, 
as it is for most birds. as such, they have evolved specialized nostrils which close and 
prevent salt-water from being forced in when they dive, and have resorted to breathing 
out of the corners of their mouths.
3-3 The Marine Iguana
marine iguanas (Amblyrhynchus cristasus) are the only sea-going lizards in the world 
and are found mostly on the volcanic islands of the galapagos which are strewn with 
barren, black volcanic rock and where there is little to eat. it is assumed that they are 
genetic descendants of other land-based iguana forms, and they comprise the only va-
riety which dares to risk the dangers of the sea. while their origins are much debated, 
they are thought to have evolved from a common south american iguana ancestor, 
having perhaps arrived in the galapagos via driftwood. in such a harsh environment, 
marine iguanas developed and selected the behavior of diving and swimming underwa-
ter to feast on the algae on the ocean floor, holding their breaths during submergence. 
like other iguanas, they have a nasal gland that enables them to remove salt from the 
body, to excrete or snort out salt crystals, so as to maintain electrolyte balance. But since 
eating marine algae forces them to digest sea salt, marine iguanas rely on this gland 
more than other iguanas. they have evolved a blunter snout with which to effectively 
scrape algae off of rocks, and a flatter, longer, more muscular tail than other iguana va-
rieties, which enables them to swim effectively. they have larger claws than other vari-
eties which enable them to cling to rocks when exiting the water. also, because marine 
iguanas forage in the cold water, they must regulate their body temperatures. marine 
iguanas are physiologically able to shunt blood away from the surface of their bodies to 
conserve heat, and they can reduce their heart rate and metabolism. they also warm 
up on land by huddling together with others and by basking in the sun on rocks near the 
shore. the marine iguana’s unique black and more somber coloration, among iguana 
species, assists in this process. darwin called them “imps of darkness” during his visit 
to the galapagos islands. marine iguanas suffered hardships in the 1980s when higher 
water temperatures killed off vast tracts of undersea algae.
3-4 The Woodpecker Finch
the woodpecker finch (Camarhynchus pallidus) has developed a behavior that is now 
believed to be “innate.” the finch “uses cactus spines and twigs as tools” in order to root 
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out “hard to reach arthropods: inside tree trunks and branches.” according to etholo-
gists, “the behavior is a learned one: as it involves multiple steps (finding a stick, fash-
ioning the stick, using the stick) and the steps in themselves do not offer any selection 
benefits.”126 the probability of a finch developing a genetic basis to perform all the ac-
tions which are necessary to carrying out the complete function is extremely low. But 
while the behavior is suggested to have once been learned, woodpecker finch juveniles 
“can [now] perform the behavior [with their own idiosyncratic techniques] without ever 
seeing a model.”127
3-5 The Flightless Cormorant
flightless cormorants (Phalacrocorax harrisi) comprise a rare species and are unique 
among cormorant varieties in that they have lost the ability to fly. flightless cormo-
rants swim underwater for great distances, using their webbed feet as fins to search out 
octopus, eels, and small fish, and to collect seaweed for nests. over time, they have de-
veloped comparatively tiny wings than other cormorant varieties, enabling the birds to 
tuck them in to their sides, so that they do not arrest forward movement while underwa-
ter. certainly, while appearing to be subject to the laws of use and disuse, larger wings 
would prevent underwater movement. they have also developed changes in bone and 
muscle density, as well as feather structure which enable them decrease their buoyancy, 
allowing them to stay underwater for longer periods. Because the population of these 
creatures is so few, chance climactic events can change the structure of the variety sig-
nificantly, since under these circumstances, the traits of weaker members may be passed 
on.
3-6 The Galapagos Tortoise
galapagos tortoises (Geochelone Nigra) can live for almost one hundred and fifty years. 
while most of the tortoise species on each of the galapagos islands have round or 
domed shells, each is distinct. however, on one of the drier islands to which some of 
the tortoises migrated, the majority of the vegetation that the tortoises had to rely on 
for water and nourishment did not grow low down near the ground. furthermore, the 
Opuntia cactus, providing them with much of their nourishment and water through its 
dew and sap, also become taller and more tree-like. as such, the tortoises engaged in 
the behavior of stretching their necks up as vertically as they could in order to reach 
their foodstuffs. over time, the tortoises on the island developed shells with a shoulder 
arch (called “saddle-back” shells) that would allow for their neck to stretch as vertically 
as possible, accentuating this behavior. Prized for their meat and oil, sailors, explorers, 
and whalers, who visited the islands, hunted several of the species of galapagos tortoise 
to virtual extinction.
     126. ‘Blood Birds,’ p. 3.
     127. ‘Blood Birds,’ p. 3, my addition.
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3-7 Subsequent Criticisms of  the Theory of  Organic Selection
all of the cases mentioned above seem to display concrete inductive evidence for 
the theory of organic selection in its articulation that learned behavior plays an indi-
rect role in the direction of the types of congenital or mutational variations that will be 
inherited, and selected for, in future generations of a variety or species. this is not to 
say that such observations and Baldwinian conclusions are absolutely failsafe, for there 
are still a number of problems with them that can be raised. first, there is the charge 
that these examples merely depict natural selection working in its normal way, those 
organisms which do not have the phenotypic constitutions which enable survival in a 
given environment dying out, whereas those which do will generally be preserved, each 
organism passing on its favorable mutational variations to its young. while these are 
indeed normal cases in which the natural selection is doing its causal work, in mecha-
nistic accounts, there is a tendency to omit reference to the behaviors and activities of 
the organisms, regardless of whether they are representative of biological functions of 
finding food and/or a mate. however, from a Baldwinian standpoint, behavior must be 
included in the account. especially, attention must be placed on behavior as a factor 
that indirectly channels the direction of evolutionary novelty. one cannot assume that 
in all cases, organisms simply know a priori how to use any favorable characters or varia-
tions to their advantage. also, there is no singular, essential, and/or necessary function 
that any particular character or variation is to be used for. it is a creature’s behavior that 
is, for the most part, learned in the process of its life, which helps to determine how it 
will use its mutational variations to its advantage. without reference to behavior, biology 
cannot truly dispense with, or explain the lamarckian appearance of acquired charac-
teristics from environmental conditions.
second, in respect to the interpretation that the behavior has a causal role, albeit 
indirect, in the evolutionary process, Baldwin’s theory of organic selection presupposes 
a behavioral “cause” and a hereditary “effect,” where the former “precedes” the latter. 
on the one hand, the “cause” is seemingly the organism’s selective modification of its 
behavior. on the other hand, there are the evolutionary “effects,” including the result-
ing mutational variations and traits that are “associated with” or that are “in the direc-
tion of” the behaviors selected, and which are handed down to future generations of a 
species. sceptics could here invoke neo-humean scepticism concerning causality which 
points out the lack of identification of the “necessary connection” between the devel-
opment of the habit and the resulting inherited variation or mutation, and at best, we 
could say that there is a relationship of “accompaniment” between the two phenom-
ena, especially given the notion of the “indeterminate distribution” of inherited traits. 
in defense of the Baldwin’s theory, one could point to west-eberhard’s (2003) statements 
that genes can be “followers” in evolution and that behavior can “take the lead in evo-
lution … behavioral plasticity can be the first step in evolutionary change, followed by 
morphology.”128 however, even the question of precedence would not fully solve the 
problem of “causality” here. from the neo-humean perspective, mere precedence does 
     128. west-eberhard, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, pp. 157, 180.
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not necessarily imply causality, and there must be an empirically-verifiable link between 
the putatively-stated cause and the effect, if we are to conclude that there is a causal 
relationship between them. on the contrary, in defending the theory of organic selec-
tion against this neo-humean challenge, one could equally point to whitehead’s meta-
physics of relatedness which holds that there is no empirical observation of a separation 
between the two factors.129
third, in relation to the first remaining criticism that was discussed above, there are 
empirical problems in relation to the time-frame of evolution, the changes happening 
ever so gradually that they cannot be observed, and in regards to whether the develop-
ment of new habits and behaviors precede or proceed from the congenital variations de-
veloped in select individuals. correspondingly, there are empirical problems in relation 
to the enormous difficulty of catching the organism “in the act” of recognizing useful 
movements, of developing new habits, and of making selective accommodations. while 
these observations may be more readily observable in domesticated species, in nature, 
it is extremely difficult. as gould (2002) suggests, factors, such as those implied in the 
theory of organic selection, “cannot [easily] be studied directly because they work 
only in the untestable immensity of deep time, or occur so rarely that we can enter-
tain little hope for direct observation during the short span of human history.”130 in this 
vein, simpson (1953) doubted whether “the alleged effect is empirically instantiated very 
often, and, if it is, whether this can be definitively shown.”131 nevertheless, in response 
to this criticism, one could apply the same criticism to darwin’s hypothesis of natural 
selection. and this criticism also points to the problem of the unobservable character, 
for example, of mentality, which is a difficulty faced by Psychology as a whole. hence, 
one might argue that these criticisms of this inductive “evidence” for Baldwin’s theory 
of organic selection should only be leveled if and only if, one is willing to level them to 
darwin’s theory of natural selection and to the disciplines of Biology and Psychology 
as a whole.
Part 4: whitehead and the ProBlem of a Process-relational 
evolutionary cosmology
thus far in this paper, i have focused on providing a general synopsis of Baldwin’s 
theory of organic selection, including a treatment of some of the major criticisms that 
psychologists and biologists have levelled against it. i come now to whitehead, and to 
asking how Baldwin’s views on biological evolution may be integrated with the former’s 
speculative scheme, as part of the attempt to arrive at a comprehensive and systematic 
process-relational evolutionary cosmology. for starters, in contrast to the mechanist and 
     129. for a treatment of a whiteheadian response to humean scepticism regarding causality, see scarfe, 
‘on determinations of causal connection with respect to environmental Problems: hume, whitehead, 
and hegel,’ Process Studies Supplements, issue 9, 2006, www.ctr4process.org/publications/Processstudies/
Pss/.
     130. gould, The Structure of  Evolutionary Theory, 119-120.
     131. simpson quoted by depew in weber and depew (eds.), Evolution and Learning, p. 4.
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materialist assumptions held by mainstream biologists, whitehead states that his own 
aim is to sketch “an alternative philosophy of science in which organism takes the place 
of matter,”132 a standpoint one might aptly call “organismic evolutionism” in contrast to 
“materialist evolutionism.” in so doing, he takes issue with the abstractions which are 
created by the reductionistic methods of some biologists, and with the materialistic met-
aphysics that they “tacitly presuppose.”133 at the same time, he grants some leeway for 
the employment of the reductionistic methods of scientific inquiry in general, which are 
requisite for it to carry out its study of the natural world in general. as such, whitehead 
opts for a synthesis between the two sides, describing his overall philosophical frame-
work as the philosophy of “organic-mechanism.”134 these ideas provide definite clues for 
our project of arriving at a comprehensive process-relational evolutionary theory, but 
before being able to proceed further with an analysis of its relevance to Baldwin’s theory 
of organic selection, a substantial lacuna must be overcome.
in a 1985 article entitled “evolutionist theories and whitehead’s Philosophy,” george 
lucas wages a sharp criticism against scholars who naïvely assume that whitehead was 
successful in developing a comprehensive process-relational evolutionary theory or cos-
mology, namely, one based in the notion of the creative advance into novelty. according 
to lucas, “it is clear that whitehead himself does not formulate an explicit evolutionary 
cosmology, although he is understood to have formulated a process cosmology.”135 in the 
article, by way of a canvassing of all of whitehead’s major works, lucas finds that “evo-
lution and evolutionist theories play no significant role in whitehead’s metaphysics” and 
in many of his key works, “there is simply no reference to evolution what[so]ever.”136 he 
further charges that “when ‘evolution’ is mentioned or discussed at all [by whitehead 
in Process and Reality] … it is in a general, offhand, and vague fashion.”137 overall, lucas 
concludes that 
no clearly definable doctrine of evolution is in evidence in his philosophy. his 
statements about evolution and the emergent evolutionists are vague, and 
occasionally even contradictory. he does not appear overly concerned with 
giving further interpretation to the idea of evolution, and evidently had not 
clearly thought through his own position on evolution in anything approaching a 
systematic sense.138
admittedly, whitehead’s views on evolution are indeed scattered throughout his writ-
     132. whitehead, Science and the Modern World, pp. 193-194.
     133. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, new york, the free Press, 1933 / 1967, p. 154.
     134. whitehead,  Science and the Modern World, pp. 80, 107.
     135. lucas, ‘evolutionist theories and whitehead’s Philosophy,’ Process Studies, vol. 14, no. 4, winter 1985, 
p. 290.
     136. lucas, ‘evolutionist theories and whitehead’s Philosophy,’ pp. 287, 292.
     137. lucas, ‘evolutionist theories and whitehead’s Philosophy,’ p. 294.
     138. lucas, ‘evolutionist theories and whitehead’s Philosophy,’ p. 298. according to lucas, these apparent 
weaknesses in whitehead’s speculative philosophical scheme contribute to the discrediting of process 
thought, especially in analytic circles, “as a throwback to the worst examples of unrestrained nineteenth-
century speculative nonsense” (p. 290). it seems that whitehead did pay lip-service to figures like conway 
lloyd morgan, expressing the suggestiveness of the latter’s book, Emergent Evolution (1923), but rarely did he 
treat or mention evolution in an explicit manner.
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ings. however, upon further inspection, there are some extremely important passages 
concerning evolution which must be brought to light. in a passage in Science and the 
Modern World (1925), he states that
a thoroughgoing evolutionary philosophy is inconsistent with materialism. the 
aboriginal stuff, or material, from which a materialistic philosophy starts is 
incapable of evolution. … evolution, on the materialistic theory, is reduced to 
the role of being another word for the description of the changes of the external 
relations between portions of matter. … [from this perspective] there can merely 
be change, purposeless and unprogressive. But the whole point of the modern 
doctrine is the evolution of the complex organisms from antecedent states 
of less complex organisms. the doctrine thus cries aloud for a conception of 
organism as fundamental for nature. it also requires an underlying activity—a 
substantial activity—expressing itself in individual embodiments, and evolving in 
achievements of organism. the organism is a unit of emergent value, a real fusion 
of the characters of eternal objects, emerging for its own sake. thus in the process 
of analyzing the character of nature in itself, we find that the emergence of  organisms 
depends on a selective activity which is akin to purpose.139
here, whitehead is summing up his criticisms of the dominance of the materialist 
outlook in biological research, and he is arguing that from this perspective, it operates 
in a manner that is inconsistent with what it studies. for him, organisms not only have 
a “physical pole,” but also a “mental pole” that is not to be considered as simply pre-
programmed genetically. also, organisms are “life-forms,” where the “primary meaning 
of” the word “life,” for whitehead, involves the notion of “the origination of conceptual 
novelty—novelty of appetition.”140 furthermore, at the end of the passage, whitehead’s 
emphasis on the notion of selective activity, implying “purpose” and “creativity,” provides 
us with a clue which assists our overall project to construct a process-relational evolu-
tionary cosmology. here, he is referring to the principle natural selection, but also, in 
a manner quite like Baldwin, he is emphasizing the selective activities of organisms, 
which, as he says, play a role in and affect evolutionary processes.
whitehead calls this selective and creative activity of organisms “the neglected side 
… of the evolutionary machinery involved in the development of nature.”141 as was 
     139. whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 107, my emphasis. it is clear that whitehead does not 
accept chief components of the standard formulation of darwinian evolution and its materialism, since he 
suggests elsewhere that darwin and “huxley had grasped the principle of evolution in material life, but it 
never occurred to them to ask how evolution in material life could result in a man like, let us say, newton. 
… darwin’s dismissal of the transmission of acquired characteristics is another lapse. who knows where 
our bodies begin or end, or how characteristics may be transmitted otherwise than by heredity? there 
may be a thousand predispositions in a child due to the occupations of his immediate forebears. A certain 
type of  activity may have been going on in the family for generations and the child is predisposed to it. Is that ‘environment’ or 
is it heredity?” (Price, Dialogues of  Alfred North Whitehead. Boston, little, Brown, and company, 1954, p. 284, 
my emphasis). while this quote is highly suggestive of lamarckism, it does not logically omit a Baldwinian 
interpretation. also see the first chapter of The Function of  Reason (1929) for whitehead’s challenge to the 
theory of natural selection.
     140. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 102.
     141. whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 111.
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highlighted in respect to the concrete examples of Baldwin’s theory, in the mechanis-
tic account of evolutionary processes, there has been a tendency on the part of main-
stream biologists to omit reference to an organism’s selective activities, its behavior, and 
its learning. this “neglected side” stands in contrast to the privileged materialist (rather 
than developmental) focus in biological research on the adaptation of organisms to their 
environment in the struggle for existence. whitehead clarifies that there are
two sides to the machinery involved in the development of nature. on one side, 
there is a given environment with organisms adapting themselves to it. the 
scientific materialism of the epoch in question emphasized this aspect. from this 
point of view, there is a given amount of material, and only a limited number of 
organisms can take advantage of it. the givenness of the environment dominates 
everything. accordingly, the last words of science appeared to be the struggle 
for existence, and natural selection. darwin’s own writings are for all time a 
model of refusal to go beyond the direct evidence, and of careful retention of every 
possible hypothesis. But those virtues were not so conspicuous in his followers, and 
still less in his camp-followers … the other side of the evolutionary machinery, 
the neglected side, is expressed by the word creativeness. the organisms can create 
their own environment. for this purpose, the single organism is almost helpless. 
the adequate forces require societies of cooperating organisms. But with such 
coöperation and in proportion to the effort put forward, the environment has a 
plasticity which alters the whole ethical aspect of evolution.142
one highlight of this passage is whitehead’s statement that when organisms band 
together, such selective activities enable them to “create their own environment,” 
whitehead considering the environment, in contrast to the individual organism, to be 
“plastic.”143
with these key passages in mind, two questions must here be asked in light of lucas’ 
criticisms: first, where do we find the resources in whitehead’s work for arriving at a 
process-relational evolutionary cosmology? the answer to this question is that such 
resources reside in the first chapter of The Function of  Reason144 in which he: (1) offers 
a critique of the dogmatic fallacy of invoking natural selection as an all-encompass-
ing mechanism which explains every detail of evolutionary processes, without refer-
ence to the contingencies of life and to the agency of each organism in its struggle for 
survival;145 (2) alludes to the fact that organisms engage in behaviors that transform their 
     142. whitehead, Science and the Modern World, pp. 111-112.
     143. whitehead, Science and the Modern World, pp. 111-112.
     144. lucas suggests that while this text “seriously challenges his conclusions” as to the lack of treatment 
of evolutionary theory in whitehead’s corpus, “these lectures [mentioning ‘emergence’ and evolution] are 
almost entirely absorbed with developing a philosophy of culture. very little is actually said about evolution—
and what is said is once again quite general and innocuous” (‘evolutionist theories and whitehead’s 
Philosophy,’ p. 296). he continues, “the attempt to portray (The Function of  Reason) as a significant piece of 
evolutionist philosophy utterly fails” (p. 298).
     145. whitehead, The Function of  Reason, Boston, Beacon Press, 1929 / 1969, pp. 4-7. in relation to whitehead’s 
notion of the “evolutionist fallacy,” which is an instantiation of “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” he 
writes, “i must at once join issue with the evolutionist fallacy suggested by the phrase ‘the survival of 
the fittest.’ the fallacy does not consist in believing that in the struggle for existence the fittest survive to 
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environments;146 (3) provides criticisms of the rejection of final causation and of “pur-
pose,” on the part of the natural sciences, in the effort to explain evolutionary processes, 
as well as of biology’s narrowness in terms of the evidence that is admitted, stemming 
from the materialist outlook;147 (4) recognizes the importance of (what amounts to) plas-
eliminate the less fit. … the problem set by the doctrine of evolution is to explain how complex organisms 
with such deficient survival power ever evolved. … it may be possible to explain ‘the origin of species’ 
by the doctrine of the struggle for existence among such organisms. But certainly this struggle throws 
no light whatever upon the emergence of such a general type of complex organism, with faint survival 
power. this problem is not to be solved by any dogma, which is the product of mere abstract thought 
elaborating its notions of the fitness of things.  the solution requires that thought pay full attention to the 
empirical evidence, and to the whole of that evidence. … [the fallacious way of considering evolutionary 
processes under the ‘evolutionist fallacy’] embraces the doctrine of evolution, and interprets the vanishing 
of species and of sporadically variant individuals, as being due to maladjustment to the environment. this 
explanation has its measure of truth: it is one of the great generalizations of science. But enthusiasts have 
so strained its interpretation as to make it explain nothing, by reason of the fact that it explains everything. 
we hardly ever know the definite character of the struggle which occasioned the disappearance. … if the 
mere fact of dying out be sufficient proof of maladjustment to the environment, the explanation is reduced 
to a tautology. the importance of the doctrine of the struggle for existence depends on the assumption that 
living beings reproduce themselves in sufficient numbers of healthy offspring, and that adaptation to the 
environment is therefore the only decisive factor. this double assumption of prolificness and of healthiness 
is obviously not always true in particular instances. there are limitations to the doctrine of malthus” (my 
additions).
     146. whitehead, The Function of  reason, pp. 7-8. whitehead states, “there is another factor in evolution 
which is not in the least explained by the doctrine of the survival of the fittest. why has the trend of evolution 
been upwards? the fact that organic species have been produced from inorganic distributions of matter, 
and the fact that in the lapse of time organic species of higher and higher types have evolved are not in the 
least explained by any doctrine of adaptation to the environment, or of struggle. in fact the upward trend 
has been accompanied by a growth of the converse relation. animals have progressively undertaken the 
task of adapting the environment to themselves. they have built nests, and social dwelling-places of great 
complexity; beavers have cut down trees and dammed rivers; insects have elaborated a high community life 
with a variety of reactions upon the environment. even the more intimate actions of animals are activities 
modifying the environment. the simplest living things let their food swim into them. the higher animals 
chase their food, catch it, and masticate it. in so acting, they are transforming the environment for their 
own purposes.  some animals dig for their food, others stalk their prey. of course all these operations are 
meant by the common doctrine of adaptation to the environment. But they are very inadequately expressed 
by that statement; and the real facts easily drop out of sight under cover of that statement. the higher forms 
of life are actively engaged in modifying their environment. in the case of mankind this active attack on 
the environment is the most prominent fact in his existence.” we may compare deacon’s concept of “niche 
construction” to these statements regarding the fact that animals transform their environments.
     147. whitehead, The Function of  reason, pp. 10-17, 25-28. whitehead writes, “those physiologists who voice 
the common opinion of their laboratories, tell us with practical unanimity that no consideration of final 
causes should be allowed to intrude into the science of physiology.  in this respect physiologists are at one 
with francis Bacon at the beginning of the scientific epoch, and also with the practice of all the natural 
sciences. in this rejection of final causation the testimony seems overwhelming … we all start by being 
empiricists. But our empiricism is confined within our immediate interests. the more clearly we grasp 
the intellectual analysis of a way regulating procedure for the sake of those interests, the more decidedly 
we reject the inclusion of evidence which refuses to be immediately harmonized with the method before 
us. some of the major disasters of mankind have been produced by the narrowness of men with a good 
methodology. … the particular doctrine in question is, that in the transformations of matter and energy 
which constitute the activities of an animal body no principles can be discerned other than those which 
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ticity in organic life, as well as in biological research and culture, which preserves the 
possibility of the “upward trend” in terms of evolutionary novelties;148 and (5) emphasiz-
govern the activities of inorganic matter. no reactions between material components of an animal body 
have been observed which in any way infringe the physical and chemical laws applying to the behavior of 
inorganic material. But this is a different proposition from the doctrine that no additional principles can be 
involved. … the point i wish to draw attention [to] is the mass of evidence lying outside the physiological 
method which is simply ignored in the prevalent scientific doctrine [for example, the recognition of purpose 
and final causation in organic life]. … the trained body of physiologists under the influence of ideas 
germane to their successful methodology entirely ignore the whole mass of adverse evidence. we have a 
colossal example of anti-empirical dogmatism arising from a successful methodology.  evidence which lies 
outside the method simply does not count. … the problem is to understand the operations of an animal 
body. there is clear evidence that certain operations of certain animal bodies depend upon the foresight 
of an end and the purpose to attain it. it is no solution of the problem to ignore this evidence because 
other operations have been explained in terms of physical and chemical laws. the existence of a problem 
is not even acknowledged.  it is vehemently denied. … ‘Purpose’ is a category [deemed] irrelevant for 
the explanation of their bodily activities … another reason for the extrusion of final causation is that it 
introduces a dangerous mode of facile explanation. this is certainly true. the laborious work of tracing 
the sequence in physical antecedents is apt to be discouraged by the facile suggestion of a final cause. yet 
the mere fact that the introduction of the notion of final causation has its dangers is no reason for ignoring 
a real problem” (my additions).
later, whitehead suggests that “the orthodox doctrine of the physiologists demands that the operations 
of living bodies be explained solely in terms of the physical system of physical categories. … in the animal 
body there is, … clear evidence of activities directed by purpose. … the rejection of purpose dates from 
francis Bacon at the beginning of the seventeenth century. as a methodological device it is an unquestioned 
success so long as we confine attention to certain limited fields. Provided that we admit the category of final 
causation, we can consistently define the primary function of reason … to constitute, emphasize, and 
criticize the final causes and strength of aims directed towards them … a satisfactory cosmology must 
explain the interweaving of efficient and final causation … what we seek is such an explanation of the 
metaphysical nature of things that everything determinable by efficient causation is thereby determined, 
and that everything determinable by final causation is thereby determined. the two spheres of operation 
should be interwoven and required, each by the other. But neither should arbitrarily limit the scope of the 
alternative mode” (The Function of  reason, pp. 25-28). accordingly, one commentator suggests that today 
“there remains some legitimate role in biology for the concept of a trait’s function or purpose, understood 
as what the trait or what it is directed towards” (lewens, Darwin, new york, routledge, 2007, p. 52).
     148. whitehead, The Function of  reason, pp. 18-24. whitehead states, “the birth of a methodology is in 
its essence the discovery of a dodge to live. … when any methodology of life has exhausted the novelties 
within its scope and played upon them up to the incoming of fatigue, one final decision determines the 
fate of a species. it can stabilize itself, and relapse so as to live; or it can shake itself free, and enter upon 
the adventure of living better. in the latter event, the species seizes upon one of the nascent methodologies 
concealed in the welter of miscellaneous experience beyond the scope of the old dominant way. if the 
choice be happy, evolution has taken an upward trend: if unhappy, the oblivion of time covers the vestiges 
of a vanished race. with a happy choice, the new method quickly reaches its meridian stage. there is thus 
a new form of the good life, with its prolongation depending on the variety of contrast included within 
its methodical scope. on the whole, the evidence points to a certain speed of evolution from a nascent 
methodology into the middle stage which is relatively prolonged.  in the former event, when the species 
refuses adventure, there is relapse into the well-attested habit of mere life. the original method now enters 
upon a prolonged old age in which well-being has sunk into mere being. varied freshness has been lost, 
and the species lives upon the blind appetitions of old usages. … this relapse eliminates those flashes of 
novel appetition which have constituted the means of ascent to the existing stage of complex life. … there 
has been a relapse into mere repetitive life, concerned with mere living and divested of any factor involving 
effort towards living well, and still less of any effort towards living better. this stage of life … represents a 
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es the role of mental experience (not necessarily involving consciousness) as the “organ” 
of appetition, agency, and novelty in organic life.149 other highly suggestive passages 
are contained in the chapter, “the order of nature” in Process and Reality, where he dis-
cusses how the plastic, flexible, or “unspecialized society can survive through important 
changes in its environment [by] … tak[ing] on different functions in respect to its rela-
tionship to a changing environment.”150 however, the main resources for arriving at a 
slow, prolonged decay in which the complexity of the organism gradually declines towards simpler forms. 
… [But] in the animal body, we can observe the appetition towards the upward trend, with reason as the 
selective agency.”
     149. whitehead, The Function of  reason, pp. 32-34. he writes, “every occasion of experience is dipolar. it 
is mental experience integrated with physical experience. mental experience … is the experience of forms 
of definiteness in respect to their disconnection from any particular physical experience, but with abstract 
evaluation of what they can contribute to such experience. consciousness is no necessary element in mental 
experience. … mentality is the urge [of] … appetition.  it is emotional purpose; it is agency. … the higher 
forms of intellectual experience only arise when there are complex integrations, and reintegrations, of 
mental and physical experience. reason then appears as a criticism of appetitions. … mental experience is 
the organ of novelty, the urge beyond.  it seeks to vivify the massive physical fact, which is repetitive, with 
the novelties which beckon. … in its lowest form, mental experience is canalized into slavish conformity 
[to habit].  it is merely the appetition towards, or from, whatever in fact already is. … this lowest form of 
slavish conformity pervades all nature. it is rather a capacity for mentality, than mentality itself.  But it is 
mentality.  in this lowly form it evades no difficulties: it strikes out no new ways: it produces no disturbance 
of the repetitive character of physical fact. … it is degraded to being merely one of the actors in efficient 
causation. But when mentality is working at a high level, it brings novelty into the appetitions of mental 
experience. in this function, there is a sheer element of anarchy. But mentality now becomes self-regulative. 
it canalizes its own operations by its own judgments. it introduces a higher appetition which discriminates 
among its own anarchic productions.”
     150. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 100. whitehead continues, “in general the defining characteristic of 
such a society will not include any particular determination of structural pattern. By reason of this flexibility 
of structural pattern, the society can adopt that special pattern adapted to the circumstances of the moment. 
thus an unspecialized society is apt to be deficient in structural pattern, when viewed as a whole. thus in 
general an unspecialized society does not secure conditions favourable for intensity of satisfaction among its 
members, whereas a structured society with a high grad of complexity will in general be deficient in survival 
value. in other words, such societies will in general be ‘specialized’ in the sense of requiring a very special 
sort of environment. thus the problem for nature is the production of societies which are ‘structured’ with 
a high ‘complexity’, and which are at the same time ‘unspecialized.’ in this way, intensity is mated with 
survival. there are two ways in which structured societies have solved this problem. Both ways depend on 
that enhancement of the mental pole, which is a factor in intensity of experience…” (pp. 100-101); “the two 
ways in which dominant members of structured societies secure stability amid environmental novelties are 
i.) elimination of diversities of detail [via negative prehensions], and ii.) origination of novelties of conceptual 
reaction.  as the result, there is withdrawal or addition of those details of emphasis whereby the subjective 
aim directs the integration of prehensions in the concrescent phases of dominant members” (p. 102).
earlier, he states that “the members of the society are alike because, by reason of their common 
character, they impose on other members of the society the conditions which lead to that likeness. this 
likeness consists in the fact that i.) a certain element of ‘form’ is a contributory component to the individual 
satisfaction of each member of the society; and that ii.) the contribution by the element to the objectification 
of any one member of the society for prehension by other members promotes its analogous reproduction 
in the satisfactions of those other members. thus a set of entities is a society i.) in virtue of a ‘defining 
characteristic’ shared by its members, and ii.) in virtue of the present of the defining characteristic being 
due to the environment provided by the society itself…” (p. 89); “a society is, for each of its members, an 
environment with some element of order in it, persisting by reason of the genetic relations between its own 
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comprehensive process-relational evolutionary cosmology reside in whitehead’s theory 
of prehensions, which is the mantelpiece of his speculative philosophical scheme, and 
specifically, in reference to the role of “prehensive selectivity” within the creative proc-
ess. most importantly, it is through the theory of prehensions that whitehead can be 
said to account for the “neglected side of the evolutionary machinery.” consistent with 
Baldwin’s theory of organic selection, whitehead is concerned to advance an under-
standing of this side of the evolutionary processes.
second, how might scholars of process thought arrive at a process-relational evo-
lutionary cosmology? in part, a process-relational evolutionary cosmology can be ar-
rived at by reading and interpreting these whiteheadian resources in the light of Bald-
win’s theory of organic selection. the passages cited above certainly correspond with 
a Baldwinian outlook. But a reading of the theory of prehensions, with a focus on the 
theme of “prehensive selectivity,” provides the central analogy to Baldwin’s account of 
the process by which organisms develop and select behavioral novelties for future ac-
tualization, as they confront their environment, namely, the “first part” of his theory of 
organic selection, as described above. the “second part” of Baldwin’s theory concern-
ing the “orthoplastic” inheritance of correlated characteristics and mutuational varia-
tions which accentuate novel behavioral modifications may generally be integrated with 
whitehead’s doctrine of “objective immortality,” in which the selective accommodations 
an individual organism makes in its lifetime are inherited by subsequent generations 
of its species. in the next section of this paper, i shall provide the basic “skeleton” for 
such an integration by drawing out some of the chief tenets of the theory of prehensions 
which coincide with Baldwinian themes.
Part 5: whitehead’s theory of Prehensions
in previous publications,151 i have argued that operations of prehensive selectiv-
ity, involving the interplay of positive and negative prehensions, constitute the efficient 
cause of the creative process. whitehead’s descriptions of the creative process can also 
be interpreted as the learning process of an organism, and can also account for the proc-
ess by which behavioral novelties are arrived at by organisms, as alluded to in Baldwin’s 
scheme. like Baldwin, whitehead holds that all organisms have some degree of men-
tality. consciousness, for him, is chiefly attributable to the higher organisms, and it is 
in conscious experience that operations of negation and selectivity are at their most in-
tense. while whitehead agrees with both darwin and Baldwin that human beings can 
members” (p. 90).
chapter two on “expression” in whitehead, Modes of  Thought, new york, the free Press, 1938 / 1968, pp. 
20-41 is also quite suggestive of the origin of novelty, as are the final chapters, “nature lifeless” (pp. 127-147) 
and “nature alive” (pp. 148-169), although these would not satisfy lucas’ critique. Adventures of  Ideas also 
contains some suggestive passages for a comprehensive process-relational evolutionary cosmology.
     151. see scarfe, ‘negative Prehensions and the creative Process,’ Process Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, 2003, pp. 
94-105, and scarfe, ‘Prehensive selectivity and the learning Process,’ in riffert (ed.), Alfred North Whitehead 
on Learning and Education: Theory and Application, newcastle, cambridge scholars Press, 2005, pp. 123-158.
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be placed on a continuum with other animals in terms of mentality, he holds that selec-
tivity is more acute in the higher experiences (e.g. conscious experience) of the higher 
organisms, such as human beings. to be sure, whitehead writes that “in the passage 
from our lower type animal experience to our higher type human [conscious] experi-
ence, we [acquire] a selective emphasis whereby the finite occasions of experience receive 
clear definition.”152
in contradistinction to the traditional philosophical notions of “perception” or 
“sense-perception,” which are “shot through and through with the notion of cognitive 
apprehension,” whitehead’s term, “prehension” refers to the “apprehension” of data at 
the root of experience, an activity which may or may not be cognitive. hence, the word, 
“prehension” in whitehead’s cosmological scheme refers to the “uncognitive apprehen-
sion” of experienced data.153 the word “prehension” also means “feeling,” “grasping,” 
“taking account of,” or “seizing,” pointing to operations which are not necessarily cogni-
tive in nature. a prehension, analogous to biological processes such as the ingestion of 
food, designates an organism’s “appropriation,” for “the foundation of its own existence, 
the various elements of the universe out of which it arises.”154 that is to say, an organ-
ism, as a “prehending subject” appropriates data, food, or resources from its environ-
ment for its own process of self-development and growth. for whitehead, every act of 
prehending involves a process of selection in which some data are (positively) accepted 
and appropriated into the organism’s constitution in virtue of data that are excluded or 
eliminated. specifically, he depicts that experience is constituted, in part, by the fluc-
tuation of “positive” and “negative” prehensions. Prehensions of the positive and nega-
tive varieties operate conjunctively in virtue of a process of selection. while a positive 
prehension “is the definite inclusion of [data] into positive contribution to the subject’s 
own real internal constitution,” a negative prehension involves “the definite exclusion 
of [data] from positive contribution to the subject’s own real internal constitution.”155 
a positive prehension involves an organism’s seizure, inclusion, and retention of data 
as potentialities for future actualization, whereas a negative prehension consists in the 
elimination or the rejection of data from entering into its constitution, or of holding 
the data inoperative. for whitehead, organisms “eliminate, by negative prehension, 
the irrelevant accidents in [their] environment”156 in virtue of eliciting attention to data 
which impress upon them or which are relevant to their aims. for example, an injured 
land iguana that is away from its nest, and which is a potential source of nourishment, 
is generally more interesting to a short-eared owl than a piece of volcanic rock on the 
empty landscape. in whitehead’s scheme, all positive prehensions are accompanied by 
negative prehensions, and it is in virtue of the elimination of irrelevant data that rele-
vant data are accepted. through alternating prehensive integrations and eliminations, 
selected data are objectified and are assimilated by the organism. for whitehead, the 
     152. whitehead, Modes of  Thought, p. 77, my emphasis.
     153. whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 69.
     154. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 219.
     155. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 44.
     156. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 317.
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process of selective appropriation involving the fluctuating interplay of positive and neg-
ative prehensions, occurs at each phase of concrescence (i.e. from simple physical feel-
ings to conscious experience in the higher animals), and is written into the very fabric of 
organic experience in general.
whitehead’s theory of prehensions can be said to comprise a descriptive framework 
that accounts for how organisms learn, how they imitate other organisms, and how they 
selectively make novel accommodations, developing new habits and engaging in novel 
behaviors, in a parallel manner with Baldwin’s theory of organic selection. the white-
headian notion of prehensive selectivity, which does not necessarily imply conscious 
experience, accounts for the organism’s agency (neither fully conditioned by the envi-
ronment, nor fully transcendent of it) in the creative life-process. the process of concres-
cence runs through three general phases: (1) a selective appropriation of data physically-
felt, (2) the conceptual feeling and the creative transformation of the prehended data, 
and (3) the attainment of the “satisfaction” of the organism, whereby novelties in terms 
of behavior are successfully realized, and are, in turn, prehended and/or assimilated by 
other organisms. here, i shall provide a general outline of some of the general phases 
of the creative process which warrant parallels with Baldwin’s theory of organic selec-
tion, and which may serve to strengthen and/or improve upon the latter’s account of 
organic experience.
5-1 Physical Feelings
in tracing the various phases of the creative process with reference to Baldwin-
ian themes, whitehead’s analysis commences with what he calls “physical feelings,” in 
which the data felt involve “objectifications of other actual entities.”157 like Baldwin, 
whitehead’s philosophy of organism is “provisionally-realistic,” holding to the notion 
that all the “resources” or the data that are entertained in mental operations are derived 
from physical experience. according to whitehead, simple physical feelings are among 
the most primitive type of feelings, being the “bedrock” of organic experience. Physical 
feelings involve the feeling of “the here and now” and nothing further. the notion of a 
simple physical feeling comprises a generalization from hume’s notion of “impressions 
of sensation,” without the sensationalist presupposition of consciousness (which Baldwin, 
to a certain extent, assumes). in contrast to conscious experience, which involves a high-
level of abstraction from physical experience, simple physical feelings involve the imme-
diacy of bodily experience of organisms, which are at once, caused by, and seized from 
other actualities. the data are felt as they are received by, impact on, or “bombard” 
the organism’s physical body and sensory organs. the physical reception of the data in 
the environment is the starting point for the creative process. simple physical feelings 
also involve the visceral bodily reactions of the organism to stimuli in the environment, 
muscular contractions, shivering from the cold, or shuddering due to fear of the pos-
sibility of a predator in the environment. they also involve emotions, where “emotions 
     157. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 245.
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are accompanied by the clearest recognition of other actual things reacting”158 on the 
prehending organism. in relation to physical feelings, whereby some data produce posi-
tive feelings (e.g. sweet taste and bodily pleasure) are while other data produce negative 
feelings (e.g. bitter taste and bodily pain), a process of selection ensues. in part, white-
head’s analysis here can be said to parallel Baldwin’s account of the organism’s selection 
of experiences and movements for repetition, on the basis of the pleasure or pain that 
they produce. in any case, while whitehead holds that “physical and mental operations 
are incurably intertwined,”159 each organism having a physical and mental experiential 
pole, one can imagine that many of the lower organisms do not get very far beyond 
physical experience and/or transcend nervous functioning of this type.
5-2 Conceptual Feelings
according to whitehead, “conceptual prehensions, positive or negative, constitute 
the primary operations among those belonging to the mental pole of an [organism].”160 
conceptual experience is largely characterized by a mental reproduction and re-enact-
ment of objective data, which have been prehended physically. the notion of concep-
tual experience, for whitehead, implies mentality, but it does not necessitate the attribu-
tion of consciousness. conceptual experience arises as the objective datum of a physical 
feeling, selected via negative prehensions, enters into the organism’s internal constitu-
tion as a potentiality for future actualization. there is a conceptual reproduction of the 
datum, perhaps a new movement, which the organism may re-enact in mentality. for 
whitehead, finite organisms cannot reproduce every element of their physical experi-
ence mentally, and therefore, via the fluctuation of positive and negative prehensions, 
they must make a selection of which to copy mentally. the mental operations of con-
ceptual reproduction and re-enaction constitute the basis for the entertainment of con-
ceptual data and for the development of conceptual novelties. the data may be further 
integrated into the prehending organism’s internal constitution and selected, such as to 
be repeated, potentially in the process of becoming a habit for it. conceptual feeling is 
constituted by “the feeling of an unqualified negation; that is to say, it is the feeling of a 
definite eternal object with the definite extrusion of any particular realization.”161
whitehead’s notion of an “eternal object” can be said to account for Baldwin’s 
“copies” in the first phase of the circular reaction that is imitation. eternal objects have 
their origins in conceptual data, selected from physical experience, which are enter-
tained in mentality. for whitehead, conceptual experience is more than just “simple 
reproduction … [rather], it selects, it emphasizes, it adds.”162 an eternal object “may be 
included positively by means of a conceptual feeling; but it may be excluded by a nega-
     158. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 146.
     159. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 317.
     160. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 240.
     161. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 243.
     162. whitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy, new york, Philosophical library, 1948, p. 149.
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tive prehension,”163 and is subject to a further process of selection. By way of the fluctua-
tion of positive and negative conceptual prehensions, some reproductions and re-enac-
tions are selected and kept as eternal objects, introducing creative purpose in the sense 
of being novel potentials for future actualization, while others are held to be irrelevant 
and are left inoperative, as in movements which are not to be repeated because they 
produce pain. still others are creatively modified, transformed, or enhanced by their 
synthesis with component data derived from reproductions of other occasions, which 
adds “value” to them, and the reproductions may become novel potentialities for future 
actualization. however, according to whitehead “if the mental activity involves no in-
troduction of ideal novelty, the data of the conceptual feelings are merely eternal ob-
jects already illustrated in the initial phase of re-enaction.”164 in conceptual experience, 
negative prehensions are the chief operation involved in the process in which the organ-
ism valuates eternal objects and selects those which are relevant to it, eliminating those 
which are not. those eternal objects which are selected by the organism will be poten-
tials for future actualization which will be further integrated into its internal constitu-
tion. through conceptual feelings, the organism “values up, or down, so as to determine 
the intensive importance accorded to the eternal object.”165 in valuating eternal objects 
as to their intensive relevance, organisms select which contents and movements are im-
portant to them, to some extent on the basis of the pleasure or pain felt as a result, and 
to their own adaptive success, thereby establishing novel habits, “subjective aims,” and 
the means to attain such appetitions. this selective valuation at the root of conceptual 
experience can be said to account for Baldwin’s notion of “functional selection,” where-
by the organism selects a behavior on the basis of the recollection of a movement (e.g. 
a particular hunting movement) or event in which it successfully procured the resources 
it needed, and which produced feelings of pleasure over pain. at the level of conceptual 
feelings, there is a selection of eternal objects, some being said to constitute novel po-
tentialities (e.g. anticipations for future actualization or future behavior) to be repeated, 
while some of which constitute older habits. Baldwin’s emphasis on “plasticity” can be 
said to be accounted for in whitehead’s scheme by the ability to select novel eternal 
objects in the process of making novel accommodations to behavior, while “fixity” can 
be interpreted as acting in a repetitive manner in correspondence with specific eternal 
objects. in any case, it might be suggested that mainstream biological research largely 
omits reference to what whitehead calls the “mental pole”166 of the organism in the evo-
     163. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 239.
     164. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, p. 194.
     165. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 241.
     166. in explanation of the notion of the “mental pole” of an organism, whitehead writes “mental 
operations determine their subject in its character as an efficient cause. … the mental pole is the link 
whereby the creativity is endowed with the double character of final causation, and efficient causation. 
the mental pole is constituted by the decisions in virtue of which matters of fact enter into the character 
of the creativity.  it has no necessary connection with consciousness; though, where there is origination of 
intellectual feelings, consciousness does in fact enter into the subjective forms” (Process and Reality, p. 277). 
according to whitehead, for many organisms, but not all, the “mental pole” is a center of reaction and 
control (p. 108).
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lutionary process, and, in some cases, assumes that, in every instance, the “mental pole” 
is genetically pre-programmed and pre-determined. however, under both Baldwin’s 
and whitehead’s explanations, the “mental poles” of organisms are crucial in the proc-
ess of its adaptation to the environment. whereas physical feelings provide the materials 
for mental experience, conceptual feelings are at the root of creative novelty, of accom-
modation, and of the development of novel behavioral habits.
5-3 Transmutation and Transmuted Feelings
for whitehead, conceptual reproductions and re-enactions of physical feelings orig-
inate mental experience, but the phase of transmutation and transmuted feelings is a 
further stage which refers back to physical experience. whitehead’s notions of “trans-
mutation” and “transmuted feelings” involve a process whereby conceptual experience 
re-acquires its reference to actuality, thereby integrating the conceptual with the physi-
cal. through transmutation, the organism “transmutes the datum of [a] conceptual 
feeling into a contrast with the nexus of those prehended actual entities.”167 in other 
words, the organism ascribes an eternal object onto actualities physically felt, perhaps 
applying its selected movements to a similar situation, or attributing “danger—avoid” to 
a certain group of organisms which attempted to eat it, thereby causing it pain. trans-
mutation may also involve the organism may be the anticipatory first step toward the 
repetition of selected hunting movements, the development the muscular coordination 
in order to be able to perform them, and/or the application of them to this or that 
situation. for example, the short-eared owl of the galapagos, repeating its particular 
movement of hiding in the frigate bird’s den in order to catch its prey as it returns to its 
nest. in transmutation, the organism applies the selected movement to this or that situ-
ation, for instance, to catch this or that type of prey to the elimination of others. since 
no two instantiations of a movement are the same, variations and novelties on it accrue 
in its performance. in transmutation, “novelty of circumstance is met with novelty of 
functioning,”168 where error in the natural world, in sense of the application of the novel 
movement to the wrong situation can result in the organism’s death. the organism an-
ticipates and imitates its conceptually-reproduced “copy” of the action, via transmuted 
feelings, thereby closing the loop of the “circular reaction” that, as Baldwin describes, 
is at the root of imitative behavior. in the process by which the actualities are felt in 
conjunction with an eternal object, in transmutation the feelings of the eternal object 
are ascribed to the actualities in question. and the set of actualities in question is felt in 
conjunction with the feelings of a valuated eternal object. if the actualities are associ-
ated with an eternal object which was positively prehended in conceptual experience 
and was valued upward in terms of its intensive importance to their own adaptation to 
their environment (e.g. in relation to the accessibility of food), then the organism will 
generally react with adversion to those actualities. however, if the actualities are associ-
     167. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 240.
     168. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, p. 207.
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ated with an eternal object that was valued downward (e.g. bad tasting food), then the 
organism will generally react with aversion. adversion and aversion are exemplified by 
emotional responses toward the actualities felt with reference to the feeling of the eternal 
objects ascribed to those actualities. as whitehead writes, “anger, hatred, fear, terror, 
attraction, love, hunger, eagerness, massive enjoyment, are feelings and emotions closely 
entwined with the primitive functioning of ‘retreat from’ and ‘expansion towards’.”169 in 
any event, transmutation and transmuted feelings do not necessarily involve conscious 
experience. for whitehead, while all organisms have a degree of mentality, most organ-
isms do not attain to consciousness.
5-4 The Higher Levels of  Experience: Propositional Feelings and Consciousness
the higher organisms are distinct from the lower organisms in respect to the intensi-
ty of their selective operations and their capacity for conscious decision-making. accord-
ing to whitehead, “mentality as it emerges into coordinated activity has a tremendous 
effect in selecting, emphasizing, and disintegrating.”170 for him, only the higher organ-
isms can entertain propositions and propositional feelings (involving symbolic reference 
and language), as well as comparative intellectual feelings involving intuitive judgments 
and consciousness, the hallmarks of which are operations of negation, decision (in the 
root sense of a “cutting off”), and the negative intuitive judgment, wherein negative pre-
hensions are at their most intense. to be sure, the latin root, intellectus means “chosen 
among” exemplifying the fact that the selective capacity is the most intense at this level. 
But consistent with his standpoint on non-cognitive “prehensive” experience, whitehe-
ad writes that “the word ‘decision’ does not … imply conscious judgment, [al]though in 
some ‘decisions’ consciousness will be a factor,”171 the difference being in the intensity of 
the negation in question.
in further getting at the meaning of consciousness, whitehead holds that “it is the 
mark of a high-grade organism to eliminate, by negative prehension, the irrelevant ac-
cidents in its environment, and to elicit massive attention to every variety of systematic 
order.”172 But like both James and Baldwin, he further reminds us that “that portion of 
experience irradiated by consciousness is only a selection. thus consciousness is a mode 
of attention … provid[ing] the extreme of selective emphasis”173 which involves a high 
degree of abstraction in contrast to physical experience and which makes us liable to 
error. for whitehead, consciousness is “the crown of experience, only occasionally at-
tained, not its necessary base.”174 consciousness, involving judgments concerning the 
comparison of selected conceptual contents and selected actualities, beyond the cri-
teria of pleasure and pain, enables human beings to have a high degree of plasticity 
     169. whitehead, Symbolism, new york, fordham university Press, 1927 / 1955, p. 45.
     170. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, p. 100.
     171. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 43, my emphasis.
     172. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 317.
     173. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, p. 270.
     174. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 53.
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and adaptability to the environment. whitehead writes that “mankind is that factor 
in nature which exhibits in its most intense form the plasticity of nature. Plasticity is 
the introduction of novel law.”175 furthermore, it is by way of consciousness, language, 
and reason that human beings conceptually divide and decide the form of their environ-
ment, enabling them a higher degree of control of it. however, whitehead writes that 
“the right coordination of negative prehensions is one secret of mental progress … but 
unless some systematic scheme of relatedness characterizes the environment, there will 
be nothing left whereby to constitute vivid prehension of the world.”176 that is to say, 
sheer negation, decision, and negative prehension without positive prehension does not 
allow for the selectivity necessary for creative novelty in general. analogously, from a 
whiteheadian point of view, the sheer eliminative aspect of natural selection, without 
the advantageous variations and their preservation, can produce no creative novelty. in 
any event, whitehead’s treatment of conscious experience, which involves propositional 
and intellectual feelings can be interpreted in light of inquiry into the symbolic dimen-
sion of evolutionary processes, as for example, in biosemiotics and in memetics.177
5-5 Organic Satisfaction and Objective Immortality
the creative discovery, on the part of an organism, of a novel movement which is 
both successful and repeatable, enables the creature to become better adapted to its en-
vironment. in some measure, as whitehead writes, the organism has attained a degree 
of plasticity, namely, an “originality of response to stimulus … its reactions [being] in-
explicable by any tradition of pure physical inheritance.”178 the success of the novel ac-
commodation leads to what whitehead describes as the “the contentment of the crea-
tive urge by the fulfillment of [the organism’s] categoreal demands,”179 namely, to its 
“satisfaction” of function or purpose. with the attainment of a novel activity that ena-
bles it to be better adapted to its environment, the organism may leave its mark on the 
species and is, in general, in a better position to be able to reproduce successfully, there-
by further leaving its mark on subsequent generations in the species. the satisfaction 
derived from the organism’s success in making behavioral accommodations which allow 
it to be better off is reflected in whitehead’s notion of “objective immortality.”
objective immortality, by which whitehead generally means the irreversibility or 
the stubborn fact of organic attainments, can be said to channel the direction of the 
future organic activity as well is generally consistent with the second part of Baldwin’s 
theory of organic selection. whitehead calls the successful organism a “subject-super-
ject.” at every stage of life, an organism can be considered a “subject” or an agent, yet 
it is always already a “superject,” although it may be considered so to various degrees 
     175. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, p. 78.
     176. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 254.
     177. see Jablonka and lamb’s (2005) discussion of the “symbolic dimension” of evolution in Evolution in 
Four Dimensions, especially pp. 298-310.
     178. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 104.
     179. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 219.
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“according to the relative importance of the novel factors in its final satisfaction.”180 as 
“objectively immortal” and as a “superject,” the organism’s novel behavior becomes 
“becomes a real component in other living immediacies of becoming.”181 as such, the 
organism’s “own activity in self-formation passes into its activity of other-formation,”182 
and it becomes “a datum for succeeding generations of actual entities.”183 these white-
headian statements can be interpreted as generally suggestive of the Baldwinian notion 
that organisms hand down their successful attainments to other members of their spe-
cies, which, for example, prehensively appropriate and imitate such successful move-
ments, thereby improving themselves in terms of their adaptation to the environment. 
and whitehead writes that each organism emerges with reference to decisions that are 
made “for it” by other organisms, and “provides decisions for other [organisms] which 
supersede it.”184
new habits which are introduced into a population in conjunction with the devel-
opment of novel phenotypic traits can unify the members of a variety or species. as 
whitehead explains, in order to constitute what he calls a “society,” there must be a “ge-
netic derivation from other members of that same society … the members of the soci-
ety [being alike] because, by reason of their common character, they impose on other 
members of the society the conditions which lead to that likeness.”185 in other words, 
members of a species or variety are unified through their habits in terms of their be-
havior. Behavioral accommodations pass from the one individual organism to the many 
organisms, although whitehead writes that in the process by which “the novelty is intro-
duced conceptually [it may] disturb[] the inherited ‘responsive’ adjustment of subjective 
forms”186 belonging to the species’ or variety’s “tradition.” the selection and imitation 
of new movements by the other members of the variety or society further reinforces it, 
and make it ever more fixed as a habit in the species. from this perspective, the “con-
crescence” or growing together of actual occasions does not only pertain to the physical 
merging of the members of a variety of organisms, but to also to the merging of species, 
through the selection of common functions and behaviors. But especially when compet-
ing activities hold the key to survival, the novel behavior may also divide a species, caus-
ing a split between those members that prehend and imitate the novel action and those 
that do not, which potentially creates new varieties, and even new species.
as in Baldwin’s theory of organic selection, in subsequent generations of the spe-
cies, individuals which inherit mutational variations that are coincidental and/or cor-
relative to the novel behavior or function have an advantage in the struggle for exist-
ence and tend to be selected for. thus, the new movement has an indirect causal role 
     180. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 102.
     181.whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. xiii-xiv.
     182. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, p. 193.
     183. sherburne, a Key to Whitehead’s Process and Reality, chicago, university of chicago Press, 1966, p. 
206.
     184. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 43, my addition.
     185. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, pp. 203-204.
     186. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 104.
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in the evolutionary advance of the species, in terms of the useful phenotypic variations 
that accrue. however, corresponding to whitehead’s standpoint of “organismic evolu-
tionism,” the tracing of the evolution of enduring “patterns” or “structures of activity,”187 
which allow organisms to adapt and to creatively modify their environments, deserves 
an equivalent emphasis. as such, whiteheadians might attempt to decenter the all-out 
emphasis placed by materialist evolutionists and mainstream biologists on the inherited 
mutational variations in terms of the overall importance and meaning of evolutionary 
processes, and may seek to include common and enduring behavior amongst organisms 
within its definition of a species. nevertheless, while not expressed by whitehead, from 
a process-relational perspective, those coincidental variations which serve to accentu-
ate, amplify, and perfect the new function, would lead to further intensities in terms of 
function in the species. in this light, Baldwin’s elaboration on the organism giving “de-
terminate direction” to evolution is thoroughly compatible with whitehead’s scheme, es-
pecially when interpreted as an extension of the doctrine of objective immortality. how-
ever, in order to more thoroughly integrate Baldwin’s theory into whitehead’s scheme, 
new phases of concrescence may need to be elaborated. a further consideration is that 
the novel creative activity that unites members of a species in a common function, in 
relation to subsequently changing environments, may again have to be overcome if 
the species is to be preserved. overall, according to whitehead, the successful adapta-
tion and the flourishing of a species take place especially when the “influence of each 
organism on the environment [is] favourable to the [development and] endurance of other 
organisms of the same type.”188 at any rate, from the preceding analysis, it is clear that 
Baldwin’s theory of organic selection can be successfully and fruitfully integrated with 
whitehead’s theory of prehensions in the project to arrive at a comprehensive process-
relational evolutionary cosmology. at the same time, whitehead’s philosophy provides 
the much-needed metaphysical and epistemological underpinning for Baldwin’s theory, 
enriching it by offering a universal, conceptual framework with which to interpret the 
meaning of organic selectivity, and deepening the Baldwinian understanding of the 
selective processes of organisms which, as he depicts, guide and inform evolution. es-
pecially, whitehead’s account of non-cognitive (i.e. prehensive) selectivity is helpful to 
Baldwin’s thought, in overcoming the lingering sensationalist assumptions that remain 
present in his work, and in further distinguishing between mentality and consciousness. 
it also serves to highlight the fact that organic selection can by no means be consid-
ered the mere “coarse filter”189 of cognition, but rather, it involves the vast complexity of 
experience, mental and physical. for example, it involves feelings or prehensions, emo-
tions, and mental events which may be conceived as lasting for nanoseconds. in the next 
section of this paper, the two schemes will be further brought together in order to de-
velop an enlarged notion of organic selection, one which is, in turn, more thoroughly 
integrated with darwin’s principle of natural selection.
     187. whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 108.
     188. whitehead, science and the modern world, p. 110.
     189. goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots, p. 157.
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Part 6: an enlarged concePtion of organic selection: some 
Baldwinian-whiteheadian cosmological sPeculations
in further merging Baldwin’s theory of organic selection with whitehead’s theory 
of prehensions, a subsequent question pertaining to the meaning of darwin’s chief 
notion of natural selection must be answered. standing for the notion that some or-
ganisms survive and reproduce successfully, passing on their characteristics to future 
generations, while others are eliminated, the principle of natural selection is depicted 
by darwin as being the efficient cause and/or the chief mechanism that explains evo-
lutionary processes. that said, for him, it is not the only causal factor. in the Origin of  
Species, darwin describes natural selection as “the main but not exclusive means of 
modification,”190 nature having a “multiply dependent structure” in which the causes 
of evolution are only to be found among “a tangled bank of organic relations.”191 for 
darwin, the eliminative operations of natural selection are
daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, every variation, even the 
slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good; 
silently and insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at 
the improvement of each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic 
conditions of life.192
consistent with darwin’s view, Baldwin interprets the notion of natural selection 
to mean that
some living creatures survive and propagate their kind when others … cannot. 
those that survive and propagate appear to have been ‘selected’; but they are 
naturally selected, without any … further reason of any kind than just the fact that 
they survive naturally when others die.193
furthermore, in Baldwin’s synopsis, the principle of natural selection involves the 
concurrence of four factors: the overproduction of organisms and variation, the struggle 
for existence, the survival of the fittest, and the inheritance of characters and mutational 
variations.
an important question that has been raised by evolutionary theorists ever since 
darwin in regards to the principle of natural selection, is what, exactly, is doing the 
“selecting.” in response to this question, darwin himself employed “the analogy of a 
‘Being’ who superintends the operations of natural selection … invit[ing] us to imagine 
that the creator is really in charge of natural evolution” to help explain the selection by 
the environment of better adapted organisms. as one commentator suggests, stemming 
from darwin’s anthropocentric metaphor, it is “all too easy to think of nature as a con-
scious selecting agent [and/or] … as an arm of divine providence.”194 it is obvious that 
     190. darwin, Origin of  Species, p. 69.
     191. richards, ‘darwin on mind, morals, and emotions,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, cambridge, 
cambridge university Press, 2003, p. 112.
     192. darwin, Origin of  Species, p. 133.
     193. Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities, p. 4.
     194. Bowler, Evolution: The History of  an Idea, Berkeley, university of california Press, 1989, p. 169.
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this analogy is not the answer that inquirers are looking for. for it would mean that a 
creator consciously presides over a great holocaust of organisms and over the elimina-
tory “cruelties”195 of nature. rather, evolutionary theorists would do well to employ a 
non-anthropocentric conception of nature or of the environment.
in order to answer the question of what is doing the selecting from the perspective 
of a process-relational evolutionary cosmology, one can, in part, draw from whitehead’s 
The Concept of  Nature (1919), in which he defines nature as a felt “complex of related enti-
ties [wherein] the ‘complex’ is fact as an entity for thought, to whose bare individuality 
is ascribed the property of embracing in its complexity the natural entities.”196 this state-
ment is suggestive that organisms are not only in nature but that they are compositional 
of nature, each creature belonging to the total complex of many organisms comprising 
nature.197 to be sure, elsewhere, whitehead describes nature as an “organic extensive 
community”198 which is thoroughly in process and composed of living organisms, or what 
he calls “actual entities” or “actual occasions.” actual entities are finite “creatures which 
become,”199 each of which is engaged in its own creative life-process and partly consti-
tuted by its various relations with other actual entities. as such, from a process-relational 
perspective, each individual organism (including each individual human being) is a part 
of nature, a notion which, today, has currency in environmental philosophy. however, 
at the same time, it cannot be said that each individual organism is identical to, or is 
synonymous with the total complex of entities that is nature. to be sure, whitehead 
states that while “no entity can be considered in abstraction from the universe [,]… no 
entity can be divested of its own [distinct] individuality,”200 again pointing to the notion 
that the individual organism cannot be regarded as identical to, or synonymous with the 
total complex of organisms that, together, compose nature. from this outlook, neither 
the individual organism, nor a finite multiplicity of organisms is itself nature.201 never-
     195. ayala, Darwin’s Gift to Science and Religion, washington, d.c., Joseph henry Press, 2007, p. 158. 
francisco ayala uses the idea of the “cruelties” of nature, namely, the numerous predators eat their prey 
alive; parasites destroy their living hosts from within; and, as noted, females of many species of spiders 
and insects devour their mates” (p. 158), as part of a counter-claim against william Paley’s argument from 
design.
     196. whitehead, The Concept of  Nature, new york, cambridge university Press, 1919 / 1995, p. 13.
     197. as cobb writes in Back to Darwin, pp. 224-225, “from a whiteheadian perspective, the distinction 
between organisms and environment is not sharp. strictly speaking, the environment is composed entirely 
of other organisms, and every organism is part of the environment of others … organisms affect the nature 
that then ‘selects’ the ones that survive and reproduce.”
     198. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 289.
     199. whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 35.
     200. whitehead, ‘mathematics and the good,’ in Paul a. schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of  Alfred North 
Whitehead, new york, tudor Publishing company, 1941 / 1951, p. 678, my addition.
     201. while the individual organism is not nature, whitehead suggests that “an individual entity, whose 
own life-history is a part within the life-history of some larger, deeper, more complete pattern, is liable 
to have aspects of that larger pattern dominating its own being, and to experience modification of that 
larger pattern reflected in itself as modifications of its own being. this is the theory of organic mechanism. 
according to this theory the evolution of laws of nature is concurrent with the evolution of enduring pattern. 
for the general state of the universe, as it now is, partly determines the very essences of the entities whose 
modes of functioning these laws express. the general principle is that in a new environment there is an 
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theless, from these premises, an insight into the relationship between organic selection 
and natural selection becomes clear. specifically, the individual organism’s selective ac-
tivities by which it learns, and chooses its behavior, its activities, its food sources, its ways 
of life, its associations with other organisms, its mate(s),202 its breeding of stock,203 may 
all be included under the umbrella of Baldwin’s term, organic selection. equally, they 
may all be accounted for via an analysis of the operations of prehensive selectivity that 
are illuminated by whitehead as pertaining to the creative life-processes of organisms in 
his theory of prehensions. at the same time, each of these modes of selectivity can also 
be said to be contributing aspects of the total principle of natural selection.
in Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development and in Development and Evolution,204 
Baldwin provides us with schemas which list all the modes and the biotic levels of selec-
tion that researchers, up until his time, had hypothesized as playing a causal role in evo-
lutionary processes: natural selection, germinal selection, intra-selection, functional 
selection, organic selection; artificial selection, Personal selection and/or sexual se-
lection, group selection, social (or community) selection, imitative selection, Physi-
ological selection, and reproductive or genetic selection. in the schemas, he also pro-
vides a list of the means or the criterion of each of the modes of selection, as well as 
their results. while many of these manners of selection have since either been summar-
ily dismissed, re-interpreted, re-formulated, or are still being debated by evolutionary 
theorists, what is clear is that operations of selection of various sorts, occurring at various 
biotic levels, are held to be efficient causal forces in evolutionary processes. further-
more, many of these modes of selection hinge upon the decisions (both non-cognitive and 
cognitive) that are made by individual organisms in their respective life-processes, con-
sonant with whitehead’s theory of prehensions. and many of the forms of selection that 
are outlined by Baldwin may be said to overlap with others.
drawing on Baldwin’s schemas, one may speculate that organic selection can be 
said to include darwin’s notion of artificial selection within it. darwin used the term, 
artificial selection, namely, “the process by which animal breeders improve domesti-
cated species,”205 thereby, directing the evolution of their stock of animals by crossing 
only those with desirable traits,206 as part of an argument by analogy for selection under 
evolution of the old entities into new forms” (Science and the Modern world, p. 107).
     202. here i am alluding to darwin’s notion of “sexual selection,” for which Baldwin reserves the term 
“Personal selection” when discussing this notion in terms of the human species
     203. here i am alluding to darwin’s notion of “artificial selection” which belongs to human beings and 
pertains to the breeding of domesticated animals.
     204. specifically, see Baldwin’s social and ethical interpretations in mental development, pp. 547-550, 
and his development and evolution, pp. 165-172.
     205. lewens, Darwin, 164.
     206. artificial selection, for darwin, was “the one area where organic change could be observed ... 
animal and plant breeding offered an experimental way of studying the effects of variation. But it is no 
accident that the significance of both variability and hard heredity were recognized first by breeders, who 
knew that they owed their success to manipulation of these factors by selection. darwin always presented 
natural selection through an analogy with the artificial form.  the breeder picks out those individuals in 
his group which possess something of the characteristic he seeks and breeds his next generation solely from 
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nature. he described that “the key is man’s power of accumulative selection: nature 
gives successive variations, man adds them up in certain directions useful to him.”207 
while this analogy occurred to darwin after he had arrived at the latter theory, it was 
an important feature of his overall argument for natural selection in which the malthu-
sian struggle for existence substituted for the breeder’s power of choice, selecting (both 
consciously and non-consciously) those individuals best adapted to their environments 
and eliminating the others.208 in expressing the connection between organic selection 
and artificial selection, Baldwin writes, “‘organic selection’ supposes [organisms to be 
selecting themselves], in an important sense. it is a sort of artificial selection put in the 
hands of the animal himself—that is, so far as the results go.”209 Baldwin further sug-
gests that
the effectiveness of the method of screening and of so accumulating certain 
variations in producing well-marked types is seen in artificial selection, where 
certain creatures are set apart for breeding. But any influence, such as the 
individual’s own accommodation to his environment, which is important enough 
to keep him and his like alive, while others go under in the struggle for existence, 
may be considered with reason a real cause in producing just such effects. thus by 
the processes of accommodation, a weapon analogous to artificial selection is put 
into the hands of the organism itself, and the species profits by it.210
in a parallel manner, human beings are also animals and are themselves a part of 
nature, helping to compose it. in reality, although we cannot merely conflate human 
beings, much less any other organism or set of organisms, with nature (as was argued 
for above), there is no strict division where the natural and human realms begin, such 
that artificial selection is still a mode of selection which falls under the umbrella of 
natural selection. human animals, through their conscious and unconscious activities 
of selection, are making decisions for other animals which direct the evolutionary desti-
nies of the animal species. consequently, the notion of organic selection might be con-
strued as an extension of the notion of artificial selection to the rest of the animal king-
these.  he thus isolates the desired characteristics and by selecting further variations in the same direction 
can improve it in later generations” (Bowler, Evolution: History of  an Idea, p. 166). however, here we need to 
recall the limits of the power of the breeder in that “the variations nature gives are not themselves under the 
control of the breeder, he or she merely chooses from what is on offer. By showing that artificial selection 
has worked in the improvement of breeds, darwin thereby shows that variation has the characteristics 
needed to enable selection—whether artificial or natural—to generate adaptation. artificial selection, too, 
would be ineffective if variation were not plentiful, or if correlations of growth were so tightly bound as to 
prohibit the gradual improvement of any one trait. By reminding us of the efficacy of artificial selection, 
darwin supports his case for the efficacy of natural selection” (lewens, Darwin, p. 50).
     207. darwin, Origin of  Species, p.  90.
     208. here, we need to remember that “this analogy with artificial selection might suggest an image of 
nature selecting individual organisms to breed or to die according to the beneficence of their variations, just 
as a sheep breeder picks out, or selects, some individual ewe for further breeding, according to the quality 
of her wool. in contrast to this image, selection today is not understood as a force affecting individual 
organisms … (but frequencies of a trait in a population)” (lewens, Darwin, p. 62).
     209. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, pp. 170-171.
     210. Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 175.
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dom, rather than merely representing a human activity, exclusively. organic selection, 
which places emphasis on the organism’s own selective activities in its own life-process, 
can also be said to include functional selection, artificial selection, Personal selection, 
sexual selection,211 social selection,212 imitative selection, and perhaps others to some 
extent. these modes of selection are examples which, to some extent, hinge upon the 
selective activities of organisms in their life-processes.
the above speculations form the basis for an enlarged and fully “process-relational” 
conception of organic selection, standing for the total process by which organisms se-
lectively prehend their environment and each other. organic selection stands for the 
organism’s selective filters, the choices, and the decisions it makes for itself, for example, 
in relation to its own activities and behavior, as well as those it makes, either consciously 
or unconsciously, for other organisms.213 organic selection, standing for the sum total 
of the selective activities of organisms, including both those by which the creature di-
rects itself, as well as those by which it acts on other organisms, is an “appendage” of the 
principle of natural selection. from this perspective, not only are all organisms selec-
tive agents presiding over their own lives, but as a part of the natural environment, they 
     211. sexual selection is “the process by which the struggle to find a mate leads to behavioural, anatomical, 
or psychological modification. darwin believed that sexual selection was important throughout the animal 
kingdom. he thought it could account for the gaudy plumage of male birds, and the differences between 
human races and human sexes” (lewens, Darwin, p. 269). according to darwin, “sexual selection depends 
on the success of certain individual over others of the same sex, in relation to the propagation of the 
species; whilst natural selection depends on the success of both sexes, at all ages, in relation to the general 
conditions of life. … the sexual struggle is of two kinds; in the one it is between the individuals of the same 
sex, generally the males, in order to drive away or kill their rivals, the females remaining passive; whilst in 
the other, the struggle is likewise between the individuals of the same sex, in order to excite or charm those 
of the opposite sex, generally the females, which no longer remain passive, but select the more agreeable 
partners” (darwin, The Descent of  Man, p. 638).
     212. group selection is “a process of natural selection that occurs between groups. darwin usually writes 
in terms of selection at the level of the community, rather than the group.  modern biologists are divided 
on how to understand what group selection is, and on whether it is an important evolutionary process” 
(lewens, Darwin, p. 265).
     213. Piaget summarizes the refinement of definitions of the notion of selection in the 1970s as follows: “the 
doctrine on this subject [evolution], which was quasi-official among biologists some years ago, consisted 
in explaining everything by reference to purely random mutation and selection ‘after the event’. such 
an explanation now inspires less and less confidence. one reason for this is that the idea of selection 
has been subjected to serious reconsideration. it was formerly compared with a sifting process, a simple 
automatic sorting which led only to a broad dichotomy between elimination and survival. selection has 
since emerged, however, as a considerably more refined and complex concept, as regards both its results 
and the mechanism to which they are attributed. its effect is thought to be the probabilistic modification 
of the various coefficients and propositions at work in a prevailing state of genetic homeostasis—but it has 
a further and subsequent effect upon an organism’s capacity for modification, the number of its possible 
responses, and so on. Above all, the operation of  selection is increasingly understood to be bound up with factors of  
choice, in that an organism chooses its environment as well as being dependent upon it. It is bound also to the teleonomic and 
regulating systems of  the organism’s internal environment—processes of  organic selection as important as those which remain 
the responsibility of  the external environment. as the concept of selection undergoes this refinement of definition, 
the role of chance in the production of variants must, to the same extent, be limited.  selection can then be 
readily be imagined, for reasons of symmetry, as tending to operate by means of exploratory ‘trials’ (known 
also as ‘scanning’)” (Adaptation and Intelligence, p. 7, my italics).
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are themselves agents of natural selection. that is to say, all organisms participate, by 
their own selective activities, in the process by which the total environment preserves 
or eliminates other organisms, and as Baldwin has argued, by which their evolutionary 
destiny is charted. to lesser or greater extents, through their selective activities, all or-
ganisms exert a causal impact on the life-processes of other organisms, and on the proc-
ess by which other organisms are selected for and/or are eliminated as implied by the 
principle of natural selection, as well as on the evolutionary destinies of their species. 
all organisms are both subject to, and play a participating causal role in the preserva-
tions and/or eliminations of other organisms belonging to the meaning of the principle 
of natural selection, as well as are orthoplastic influences, helping to direct the evolu-
tionary destiny of other species. when placed into context with the principle of natu-
ral selection in this manner, the selective activities of organisms which are elucidated 
by Baldwin’s notion of organic selection and by whitehead’s theory of prehensions, 
can indeed be considered what whitehead calls the “neglected side of the evolution-
ary machinery.”214 as was suggested earlier in this paper, a process-relational evolution-
ary cosmology will emphasize this side (involving the selective activities of organisms in 
their life-processes) of the “evolutionary machinery.”
the enlarged conception of organic selection that has been developed here fur-
ther implies the notion of “pan-selectionism,” meaning that: (1) selection at various 
biotic levels (micro- through macro-) and from various aspects is the efficient cause of 
evolutionary processes; (2) the organisms of nature, as part of their life-processes, are 
engaged in selective activities which may or may not be cognitive in nature; (3) all or-
ganisms can be conceived as compositional parts of total complex that is nature; (4) all 
organisms, by their own selective activities, both participate in, and are a causal factor 
in respect to the eliminations and preservations which belong to the meaning of the 
principle of natural selection as well as to other modes of selection; and (5) all organ-
isms, by their own selective activities, are orthoplastic influences, helping to determine 
the direction that evolution will take in respect to the mutational variations and charac-
ters that are inherited by their own, as well as by other species. it must be noted that the 
term, “pan-selectionism,” as defined here, should not be conflated with the same term 
that is employed in molecular biology, nor with its usage in respect to weismann’s and 
wallace’s views of the “all-sufficiency” of selection.215
in light of the enlarged conception of organic selection that has been developed 
here, from a whiteheadian perspective, today, humanity’s emphasis on instrumental 
reason and technological thinking, which are the chief ways by which it exerts the mas-
sive causal impact of its selective powers and “directs its attack on the environment,”216 
     214. whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 111.
     215. see gould, The Structure of  Evolutionary Theory, pp. 198-203, 505. while biologists have traditionally 
contemplated the question regarding the “what?” question regarding selection: hypothesizing that the 
“units” or subjects of selection are one or more of a range from micro- to macro- levels, gene to cell, 
to organism, to group or clade, to local populations of a species (demes), and to species, here we are 
contemplating the “who?” question.
     216. whitehead, The Function of  Reason, p. 8.
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has contributed to its dominance over all other life-forms on the planet. through these 
means, and by its own selective activities, the human species, as a part of the environ-
ment that other creatures must live in, creates great selection pressures which impact 
on other organisms, and has, almost single-handedly, determined the evolutionary des-
tinies of entire species.217 as compared with the selective activities of other animals, as 
Jablonka and lamb (2005) point out,
without doubt, humans are the major selective agents on our planet, and have 
carried out the most dramatic reconstruction [usually destruction] of environments. 
today, in addition to changing plants and animals by artificial selection, humans 
[whether consciously or unconsciously] can alter the genetic, epigenetic, and 
behavioral state of organisms by direct genetic, physiological, and behavioral 
manipulation.218
these statements give rise to questioning concerning the ethics of selectivity in general, 
a topic that i shall address in the last section of this paper. in further integrating the 
views of Baldwin and whitehead, it will be shown that whitehead’s cosmology can also 
serve to provide an ethical foundation for Baldwin’s theory.
Part 7: Baldwinian-whiteheadian reflections on the ethics 
of selectivity
the enlarged sense of the notion of organic selection that was developed in the 
previous section would seem to stand at “the center of the storm” of the contemporary 
“creationism-versus-intelligent-design debate” that is still raging across the globe. for 
many religious believers, darwin’s theory of natural selection, as an explanation of the 
main mechanism behind evolutionary processes, is only a theory and can be, on that 
account, dismissed as not being representative of what is. from their vantage point, the 
principle of natural selection implies that evolutionary advances are the product of 
eliminatory “cruelties,”219 arising as a result of biotic competition, which manifest them-
selves either consciously or non-consciously, and either overtly or covertly. as a result, 
many christians hold that the theory of natural selection diminishes the notion of 
god, since it implies that any would-be deity presiding over nature could be said to be 
responsible for a holocaust of organisms. furthermore, some religious believers claim 
that darwin’s theory of natural selection, defined as the efficient cause of evolutionary 
processes, is a materialistic and mechanistic standpoint which implies a godless, pur-
poseless universe. for some, this leads inevitably to the bleak view that the only aim in 
life is to engage in a biotic struggle for resources toward reproductive success, thereby 
     217. whitehead writes in relation to the coordinated selective activities of human beings in transforming 
their environment, “the environment has a plasticity which alters the whole ethical aspect of evolution. the 
increased plasticity of the environment for mankind, resulting from the advances in scientific technology, 
is being construed in terms of habits of thought which find their justification in the theory of a fixed 
environment” (Science and the Modern World, p. 112).
     218. Jablonka and lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions, p. 241, my addition.
     219. ayala, Darwin’s Gift to Science and Religion, p. 158.
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converting the theory into an imperative to selectively exterminate the “less fit.”
in responding to this lacuna regarding the ethical dimension of evolution, darwin 
himself employed the notion of “social,” “group,” or “community selection.” commu-
nity selection is a mode of selection that is subordinate to natural selection. through 
it, darwin provides an account of ethical behavior as a natural phenomenon. for 
him, human beings have evolved ethical and altruistic characteristics since they have 
learned, through experience, that if one helps one’s fellows cooperatively and acts for the 
common good, for the most part, one will receive aid in return, thus, in turn, increas-
ing one’s own chance of being well off, happy, secure, and of reproducing successfully. 
however, one unresolved philosophical issue is that community selection assumes se-
lectivity in the application of ethical principles, since, for example, human beings tend 
to privilege members of their own immediate family or group, taking care of them to the 
exclusion and the potential elimination of others. as such, darwin’s naturalistic expla-
nation of morality can be described as an inherently instrumentalist position, namely, as 
a strategy of biological survival. certainly, dawkins’ (1976, 1982) perspective exempli-
fies this darwinian standpoint. this ethical instrumentalism is also at odds with kan-
tian conceptions of morality, as well as with some christian conceptions, which hold 
that human beings ought to apply universal ethical principles, i.e. non-selectively, and 
without a concern for consequences and what one “gets out of ” being moral (e.g. well-
being, happiness, security, and reproductive success). in other words, the kantian and 
some christian perspectives on morality contrast with the darwinian instrumentalist 
position, holding to the notion that morality is not simply reducible to one’s self-interest 
in the biological game of life.
from a Baldwinian point of view, the debate over the ethical dimension of evolution 
centers directly on the selective activities of organisms and on the causal role that they 
play in the preservation or elimination of others. while maintaining that organic selec-
tion is supplementary to the principle of natural selection, Baldwin held that natural 
selection itself is
not a positive agency; it is entirely negative. it is simply a statement of what 
occurs when an organism does not have the qualifications necessary to enable it 
to survive in given conditions of life; it does not in any way define positively the 
qualifications which do enable other organisms to survive … organic selection 
presents a new qualification of a positive kind which enables the organism to meet 
its environment and cope with it, while natural selection remains … the negative 
law that if the organism does not succeed in living, then it dies.220
     220. Baldwin, ‘a new factor in evolution,’ pp. 549-550. that natural selection is not a positive or creative 
force was also a view held by h. f. osborn, theodore eimer, and many others. osborne held that “selection 
is not a creative principle, it is a judicial principle” (osborne quoted by gould in The Structure of  Evolutionary 
Theory, p. 568). eimer, whose work influenced Baldwin, states “selection can create nothing new, but can 
only work with characters that already exist and are useful in and of themselves.” he continues, “natural 
selection can, as i have repeatedly remarked, create nothing new. it only so far contributes to the growth of 
the organic world that it selects the forms which are most fitted for life, and preserves them for the future 
action of new stimuli and of crossing … thus the power of selection lies chiefly in the promotion and 
diversification of organic growth. it is … only an indirect cause of the evolution of living beings” (eimer 
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in this respect, the theory of organic selection is, seemingly, a source of “hope” in 
terms of rescuing some aspect of agency and freedom on the part of the organism from 
biological determinism. however, at the same time, the enlarged conception of or-
ganic selection that i have developed in the previous section renders this interpretation 
problematic and amplifies the debate over the ethical dimension of evolution, because it 
stresses the fact that organisms themselves are partially responsible for the eliminations 
of other organisms which are inferred by the principle of natural selection and by other 
biological modes of selection. But upon further inspection of whitehead’s statements 
surrounding this issue, it is clear that the Baldwin-whitehead integration that has been 
developed in this paper offers a concrete way to mitigate it.
like Baldwin’s judgments concerning the principle of natural selection, whitehead 
held that “in unthinking nature ‘natural selection’ is a synonym for ‘waste’.”221 for him, 
without the positive valuation of conceptual data, sheer negation is not creative, and 
analogously, without the positive valuation of creatures, sheer elimination could not 
produce evolutionary novelties. rather, as was alluded to previously in this paper, in the 
theory of prehensions, whitehead emphasizes the importance of positive prehensions 
and valuations of conceptual data, within the context of the selective operations repre-
sentative of the efficient cause of the creative process. correspondingly, in his writings, 
whitehead holds to a “middle-position” in the debate over the ethical dimensions of the 
theory of evolution. on the one hand, whitehead takes issue with the religious impulses 
of his time which stubbornly resisted adaptation or adjustment to the established facts of 
science. furthermore, he admits the reality that “in the struggle for existence the fittest 
[in order] to survive eliminate the less fit,” stating that “the fact is obvious and stares us 
in the face.”222 on the other hand, whitehead provides a critique of the biological sci-
ences, which, adopting the conclusions of malthus, held that
quoted by gould in The Structure of  Evolutionary Theory, pp. 359-361). similarly, william Bateson, who later 
coined the word, “genetics”, argued that “natural selection, as a negative force, can make nothing, but can 
only choose among variants produced by another process” (Bateson, quoted by gould in The Structure of  
Evolutionary Theory, p. 412). he wrote, “selection is a true phenomenon; but its function is to select, not to 
create” and that “selection determines along which branch evolution shall proceed, but it does not decide 
what novelties that branch shall bring forth” (Bateson quoted by gould in The Structure of  Evolutionary Theory, 
p. 413). hugo de vries agreed and pointed out that in Origin of  Species, darwin had said, “the doctrine of 
natural selection or the survival of the fittest, which implies when variations or individual differences of a 
beneficial nature happen to arise, these will be preserved” (darwin, quoted in Structure 417). furthermore, 
de vries held, in contrast to darwin, that variations are “usually too small for natural selection to act 
upon, having hardly any influence in the struggle for life” (de vries, quoted by gould in The Structure of  
Evolutionary Theory, p. 416). de vries modified the darwinian theory in that it is mutational variations, rather 
than (solely) indeterminately distributed (or “random”) variations that can account for the creative force of 
evolution. on the contrary, g. g. simpson proclaimed that “selection is a truly creative force and not solely 
negative in action. it is one of the crucial determinants of evolution, although under special circumstances 
it may be ineffective, and the rise of characters indifferent or even opposed to selection is explicable and 
does not contradict this usually decisive influence” (simpson, quoted by gould in The Structure of  Evolutionary 
Theory, p.530). here, one useful analogy might be that natural selection is akin to the artist’s cutting of the 
block in the creative production of the sculpture.
     221. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, p. 159.
     222. whitehead, The Function of  Reason, p. 4.
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the destruction of individuals was the very means by which advance was made to 
higher types of species. [while] this was [darwin’s] famous doctrine of natural 
selection … the exclusive reliance upon natural selection was not characteristic 
of darwin’s own theory. for him, it was one agency among many others. But, in 
the form in which the doctrine reigned in thought from that day to this, natural 
selection was the sole factor to be seriously considered. as applied to human 
society this theory is a challenge to the whole humanitarian movement. the 
contrast between the dominant theories of lamarck and darwin made all the 
difference. instead of dwelling on the brotherhood of man, we are now directed 
to procure the extermination of the unfit. again the modern doctrines of heredity, 
gained partly from the experience of breeders of stock, partly from practical 
horticulturalists, partly from the statistical researches of francis galton, karl 
Pearson, and their school, partly from the laws of heredity discovered by mendel 
… —these doctrines have all weakened the stoic-christian ideal of democratic 
brotherhood … in the concurrence of … these strands of thought the liberalism of 
the early nineteenth century lost its security of intellectual justification.223
here, whitehead is pointing out the general frame of the perennial debate concerning 
“social darwinism” that has arisen ever since darwin’s Origin of  Species was first pub-
lished. Precisely, in relation to the notion that the truth of the biological world is “noth-
ing but” the principle of natural selection, namely, as an exact representation of what 
is, whitehead is pointing out the danger of taking this to mean that we ought to maximize 
biotic competition among human beings and to purposefully carry out the instrumental 
selective elimination of “the less fit.”224
these claims are nothing new, but they do point the way to a novel perspective 
concerning the ethical dimension of evolution. as steven Jay gould (2002) states, even 
darwin had “justly argued that nature cannot provide the source of morality,”225 and 
the debate which was further defined by figures such as thomas henry huxley and 
herbert spencer, ended up pitting “selectionists,” namely, those who defend darwin’s 
theory of natural selection as an explanation of biological evolution, against “anti-se-
lectionists,” or those who do not. the question is: where does the darwin’s concept of 
natural selection, as expressing the efficient cause of evolution, leave considerations of 
morality? again, the enlarged sense of organic selection that i have argued for in this 
paper may be said to amplify this debate. for it holds that, in part, by their own selec-
tive activities (which may or may not be cognitive in nature), organisms, in part, consti-
tute the environment within which others struggle to survive, and hence, are partially 
responsible for the eliminations implied by the principle of natural selection. and with 
respect to the human species, such selectivity, to a certain extent, spills over into society. 
to be sure, whitehead states that
it is folly to look at the universe through rose-tinted spectacles. we must admit the 
     223. whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, pp. 35-36.
     224. this is, quite obviously, a restatement of hume’s is / ought fallacy and/or g. e. moore’s “naturalistic 
fallacy,” in relation to evolution.
     225. gould, The Structure of  Evolutionary Theory, p. 121.
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struggle [for existence]. the question is, who is to be eliminated. in so far as we 
are educators, we have to have clear ideas upon that point; for it settles the type to 
be produced and the practical ethics to be inculcated.226
here, whitehead is alluding to the fact that even educational evaluation is based in a 
process of selection, which has some relation to natural selection. grading, for example, 
involves a selective evaluation of students (passing versus failing) which may partly deter-
mine their future social and economic lot in life, preserving some and eliminating others. 
while human society appears to be insulated from nature, the truth is that modern soci-
eties are to a large extent guided by selective processes which are related to the selective 
processes that are at work in biological evolution.227
religiously-motivated “anti-selectionists” typically deny the theory of natural selec-
tion as an is, in order to prevent it from being carried out as an ought. for the most part, 
they prefer an account of nature based in intelligent design, creationism, and/or natu-
ral law. moreover, for them, the crucifixion of Jesus christ is held as the ultimate sacri-
fice against such eliminatory selectionism, and many christians attempt to imitate the 
anti-selectionist standpoint in terms of behavior and action that he emphasized.228 Philip 
kitcher, in Living With Darwin, explains that most contemporary “anti-selectionists”
allow that the complex forms that emerge are descendants of significantly less 
complex ancestors, denying only that natural selection could have been responsible 
for the change. in a sense, there is still room for something like ‘creative activity’ but 
the products of that activity are new traits, organs, or structures in the descendants 
of ancestors who lacked such characteristics, rather than newly created whole 
organisms. this is the core of the official position of leading champions of intelligent 
design, and i shall call it ‘anti-selection’.229
kitcher concludes that
all we learn from the full gamut of [anti-selectionist] literature … is that they 
conceive of intelligence as whatever it is that produces the outcomes they identify 
as too complex to be attained through the operation of selection. the line of 
reasoning seems to be this: these phenomena, unattainable by selection, look 
designed or planned, and, as a result, the mechanism that produced them must 
be intelligent.230
     226. whitehead, science and the modern world, p. 205.
     227. as goodwin (1994) states, “darwin’s vision of evolution by random variation of inherited 
characteristics in organisms and by selection of the fitter variants is so simple and so convincing 
that once you have grasped it, you feel you are in possession of a universal truth. and indeed, 
this idea, or simple variations of it, tend to be applied to everything in our culture that is complex 
and changing—to the evolution of social and economic systems, to competition and survival in 
the business world, even to the development of new ideas themselves” (How the Leopard Changed 
Its Spots, p. 18).
     228. one might ask, from a biological perspective, whether religious sensibilities emphasizing particular 
behavioral habits provide us with an example of the theory of organic selection.
     229. kitcher, Living With Darwin: Evolution, Design, and the Future of  Faith, new york, oxford university, 
Press, 2007, p. 18.
     230. kitcher, Living With Darwin, p. 101.
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But the contemporary debate concerning the notion selectionism is not to be construed 
merely as a contention between science versus religion. for example, Brian goodwin 
(1994) and robert reid (2007) offer well-reasoned and non-religiously-motivated cri-
tiques of neo-darwinist selectionism, which are based in the notions of “dynamic sta-
bilization” and “biological emergence.” as reid defines the term, “selectionism is the 
belief that natural selection is the primary cause of evolution”231 and he levels the criti-
cism that natural selection is inadequate in providing an account for how “complex 
novelty” and evolutionary “innovation is generated.”232 citing goodwin’s bracketing of 
the principle of natural selection in order to expand upon generative principles in evo-
lutionary processes, reid goes on to argue for a “replacement of selection theory with 
an emergence theory.”233 for him, “emergentism could release biology from the geno-
centric universe in which it is confined and restore it to one in which whole organisms 
and their interactions are the stars of the biological and ontological fundament.”234
the debate over selectionism is also not so simple as to be a simple contention be-
tween merely two sides. drawing from both kitcher’s and reid’s stances on selection-
ism, one can logically conceive of the various positions, distinguishing between “weak” 
and “strong” versions of both “selectionism” and “anti-selectionism,” notions which 
force us to conceive of the contention across a continuum. on the one hand, “strong 
selectionism” holds that the theory of natural selection is a true representation of the 
realities of the biological world, and that we ought to carry out the elimination of “the less 
fit” for the good of our species. it thereby recommends an engagement in an unbridled 
struggle for existence and competition permeating all areas of life.235 however, the posi-
tion of “weak selectionism” holds that the theory of natural selection is a true repre-
sentation of the biological world, but that the realm of humanity is, to a certain extent, 
separate from it, and we ought not carry out the elimination of “the less fit.” on the other 
hand, “weak anti-selectionism” is the view that the theory of natural selection is not a 
true representation of biological reality, yet in this perspective, there is little in the way of 
consideration of the connection between our own selective activities, whether conscious 
or unconscious, and their capacity to enhance or diminish the lives of other organisms 
and/or to eliminate them. “strong anti-selectionism” is generally the rejection of the 
principle of natural selection. for some, this rejection has for its basis a sheer subjective 
     231. reid, Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment, cambridge, ma, the mit Press, 2007, p. 4.
     232. reid, Biological Emergences, pp. 6, 15.
     233. reid, Biological Emergences, p. 401.
     234. reid, Biological Emergences, p. 24.
     235. “strong selectionism” essentially involves the tendency to see the struggle for existence (or in the 
“global marketplace”) in the human realm beginning at the age of a small child. here, i am alluding to the 
fact that modern culture emphasizes selectivity of every type from. in the global marketplace, commercial 
selection pits business against business, employee against employee in an all-out war to eliminate the 
competition. employment hiring and firing decisions go on everyday and are manifestations of selectivity 
in which some persons are able to live well, while others, by the selection of others, are relegated to mere 
subsistence. at the extreme, racism, sexism, gender discrimination, eugenics, genocide, and abortion via 
pre-natal screening may be said to be conscious manifestations of human selectivity. “strong selectionism” 
is ethical egoism pure and simple.
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preference for intelligent design and creationism, which, in turn, are held to offset the 
notion that it is imperative to eliminate “the unfit.” for others, it involves the notion that 
natural selection cannot account for the generative aspect of evolution. it counters the 
darwinian theory both as an is and as an ought.
another position concerning these distinctions emerges from the Baldwinian-white-
headian theoretical integration that has been postulated in this paper, as well as from 
the enlarged sense of the notion of organic selection that has been developed in it. let 
us call this position, “non-reductionistic critical pan-selectionism.” again, as defined in 
this paper, pan-selectionism involves the notion that all organisms are a part of, and are 
compositional of nature and by their selective activities, play a role in the eliminations 
that belong to the principle of natural selection. non-reductionistic critical pan-selec-
tionism involves the notion that natural selection and modern genetics are satisfactory 
explanatory mechanisms of the biological sciences, which are based in materialism. 
however, these cannot be said to be true in the “nothing-but” sense, especially when 
reference to the “mental poles,” to the selective activities, and to the decisions and be-
haviors of organisms (i.e. the “neglected side” of the evolutionary machinery) is omitted, 
or where it is assumed that these are genetically pre-programmed and determined in 
every respect. non-reductionistic critical pan-selectionism is open to many aspects of 
the decentering of selectionism, for example, by theories of biological emergence. rec-
ognizing the vast complexity (i.e. the tangled web) of causal factors which have contrib-
uted to the evolution of life, non-reductionistic critical pan-selectionism does not accept 
a static reduction of the origins of biological life to natural selection only. at the same 
time, recognizing the positive aspect of selection as a preserving and generational force, 
it does not reduce the principle of natural selection to being a mere “coarse filter that 
rejects utter failures,”236 a characterization that, in some respects, was held by Baldwin 
himself. furthermore, it does not seek to explain away the meaning of ethics and of reli-
gion through evolutionary notions, such as community selection.237 rather, non-reduc-
tionistic critical pan-selectionism involves the recognition of the important role of the 
selective activities (which may or may not be cognitive), the habits, the behavior, and 
the purposes of organisms in the charting the evolutionary destiny of life on the planet.
critical pan-selectionism emphasizes the need for critical reflection on the notion 
that one’s own selective activities, both cognitive and non-cognitive, play a role in the 
eliminations that are subsumed under darwin’s principle of natural selection and other 
modes of selection. critical pan-selectionism involves the advancement of an awareness 
of the impact of each person’s own selective activities (be they cognitive or non-cogni-
tive): their own feelings, emotions, choices, judgments, decisions, divisions, discrimina-
tions and/or their own selections both on fellow human beings and on other organisms. 
at the same time, pan-selectionism involves the notions that: (1) all organisms are en-
     236. goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots, p. 157.
     237. here i am alluding to dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, new york, Penguin 
Books, 2006, and to harris, The End of  Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of  Reason, new york, w. w. norton 
& company, 2004.
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gaged in selective activities; that (2) that experience as an organism in general requires 
such activities of selection; and that (3) creativity, freedom, purpose, and evolutionary 
advance require operations of selection in various modes and at various biotic levels. 
for organisms, there is no escape from operations of selectivity, but this fact implies the 
need for a high degree of ethical scrutiny over our selective activities.
non-reductionist critical pan-selectionism emphasizes those forms of selectivity 
which are “positive,” such as the ability to think critically,238 and it involves the authentic 
desire to reduce the negative impacts of one’s selections, divisions, discriminations, and 
decisions on fellow organisms. as “critical,” it calls for a continuous epistemological in-
quiry into the selective activities of organisms in their life-processes, and their interrela-
tionship with the various modes of biological selection, in general so as to inform ethical 
praxis concerning selectivity in general. this position involves the attempt to diminish 
those selections that are destructive to organisms, such as by way of violence, warfare, 
eugenics, discrimination, unbridled marketplace competition, excessive consumerism, 
as well as the limitless employment of instrumental reason on the part of human beings, 
as for example, made manifest in genetic selection, selective cloning, and biotechnolo-
gy.239 in any event, from these distinctions, both the evolutionary cosmology and the 
ethical standpoint accompanying it that are arrived at by way of the merging of Bald-
win’s and whitehead’s respective epistemologies can be branded with the term, non-
reductionistic critical pan-selectionism. such a position might further be said to have 
strong links to environmentally and socially-engaged Buddhism and/or may be fruit-
fully advanced as a Buddhist philosophy of evolution.
conclusion
the preceding analysis has demonstrated that Baldwin’s theory of organic selec-
tion can be integrated with whitehead’s theory of prehensions in the project to arrive 
at a comprehensive process-relational evolutionary cosmology, which will constitute a 
viable alternative to the mechanistic and materialistic outlook of mainstream biology. 
in the process of this integration it has become clear that Baldwinian and whitehea-
dian modes of thought can each provide many important insights: biological, meta-
physical, epistemological, and ethical, for the other, thereby mutually strengthening the 
other. while preserving the structural “cathedral”240 of mainstream biological inquiry, 
     238. as dewey suggests in Construction and Criticism, new york, columbia university Press, 1930, p. 12, 
critical thinking involves “judgment engaged in discrimination among values. it is taking thought as to why 
the better is better and why the worse is worse” as well as discriminating between true and false statements, 
and sound and unsound arguments. and within the deliberation process that is characteristic of critical 
thinking, by which we arrive at our values, dewey states that “there is the problem of selection, of choice, 
of discrimination” (p. 24).
     239. of course, figures like dawkins are bound to accuse this “non-reductionist critical pan-selectionist 
position” as being inauthentic and of being “selfishly altruistic,” namely, as the byproduct of the determinism 
of our selfish genes.
     240. gould, The Structure of  Evolutionary Theory, p. 2.
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this integration is consistent with some current trends in evolutionary theory.241 sources 
for the project to arrive at a comprehensive process-relational evolutionary cosmology 
may also be found in connection with theories of biological emergence and in other 
researches concerning the relationship between genetic inheritance and the environ-
ment.242 a comprehensive process-relational evolutionary cosmology will emphasize the 
important causal role of the learned behaviors, the selective activities, and the mental 
poles of organisms in charting the direction of evolutionary processes, which constitute, 
as whitehead states, “the neglected side of the evolutionary machinery.” as constituting 
a “critical pan-selectionist” standpoint, it also will also emphasize the need to critically 
recognize the negative impacts of the selective operations of organisms on other organ-
isms, and to reflect on the ethical responsibilities that accrue from them. we might fur-
ther speculate as to what the impact of a critical pan-selectionist position, widely adopt-
ed, would be in terms of human development, both cultural and evolutionary. finally, 
Baldwin’s arguments for the notion that the selective activities of organisms play a causal 
role in terms of determining the direction of evolutionary processes give new meaning 
to whitehead’s final statements in Process and Reality, concerning the realization of the 
everlastingness of organic attainments, namely, the “ever-present, unfading importance 
of our immediate actions, which perish and live forevermore.”243
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